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Figure 1. Subjective Influence Score (mean) by Country 
It summarizes也eresults of a survey question which Let us begin by looking at Figure 1 
Village， town， orcity; 2. Prefecture; 3. A region covering several p児島ctures;4. National; 5. Global)， 
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asks the following: "When policy problems arise in the geographical areas suggested in Question 6 
how much influence does your organization have on such problems?" J The respondents， civil society 
organizations (hereafter CSOs) in capital cities in surveyed countriesラ self-evaluatedtheir influenceラ
and were asked to choose one担lswerfrom the following five: extremely influential=4， influential=3ヲ
somewhat influential=2， not influential= 1ラ notat a11 influential=O.ο入1ewill refer to countη， names 
rather出ancity names herea丘er.)We出encompiled these scores， or Subjective Influence Score (SIS)ラ
and calculated the mean (or SIS (me釦))for each coun町.
If Figure 1 actually reflects出erealiηラthenwhy do CSOs in the Philippines and Russia seem 
to enjoy policy -making processes by wielding strong in臼uence，while those in Gemlany， South Korea， 
and Japan are not as influential and successful in managing出epolitical-process? Moreoverラ whydo 
CSOs in China and Turkey seem to suffer even more from the lack of influence? 
The purpose of出ispaper is twofold. One is to provide a first cut to understand the realities 
of CSOs and politics， using the above司uestionsas a s筒口er.There is no doubt出at出einteractions 
between 也estate and society， or the characteristics of political regimes， historう九 culture， people's 
awarenessラandinstitutionallegacies a11 a:fect organizations' self引 raluationregarding influence. Here， 
howeverラ wea江emptto understand such differences包nongcountries by comparing JIGS (Japan 
Interest Group Survey) s町 veydata. 
To be sure， policy influence as refe汀edto here is by no means real or absolute. It is merely a 
self-evaluation in certain policy issue area in which a certain CSO is active.2 Howeverラ itmight be 
1 Q7 of Japan且GS(Japan Interest Group Survey) survey (Tsujinaka ed.1999). We have conducted瓦GSsurveys in 9 
countries (Japan， South Korea， the United S凶 es，Gennany， China， Turkey， Russia， the Philippines， and Brazil) in more th叩 2
locations each， but In thIs paper， we focus on 7 countries (capItals). The United States and Brazil are excluded in the analysis 
because no questions regarding SIS were included in the U.S. survey， and data is currently being analyzed in the Brazil 
survey. 1t is impo託antto note that there a問 slightdifferences in nuance in the questions asked in each country. The 
follmvings are the actual questions used in the survey (translated from the I∞allanguage): 
主E盟"Whenpolicy problems arise in the geographical areas categorized in Question 6 (1. Village， town， or city; 2. 
Prefecture; 3. A region covering several prefectures; 4. National; 5. Global)， how much inf1uence does your org釦 ization
have on such problems?" 
South Korea:“When policy problems arise in the geographical areas categorized in Question 6 (1. Village， townヲorcity; 
2. Prefecture; 3. A region covering several prefectures; 4. National; 5. Global)， how much influence does your organization 
have on such problems?" 
Q豆虫盟主:“日owbig do you think is the influence your organization has on the area in which it conducts its activities?" 
♀副旦盆:“Overal，how much inf1uence does your organization have on govemment's policy幽makingprocesses in your are出
of activities?" 
工区註ヱ:"When policy prひblemsarise in the g∞graphical area categorized in Q6 (1. Village， town or city; 2. P向島c加院 3
A region covering several prefectures; 4. National; 5. Global)， how much influence does your 0弔問Izationhave on such 
problems?" 
主盟主主:“Howmuch influence does your organIzatIon have on solving problems In your geographic area of activitiesワ刊
Philippine~: "When policy problem 0∞ur in the geographical area Indicated in Q6， how much influence d∞s your 
organization have in solving these problems through certain govemmental meωures (for instance， enactment of laws， 
etc.)?刊
2 1t is possible to argue that CSOs in釦me∞lturestend to overstate their score (such as influence) than others， but that Is 
beyond the scope of our蹴 alysis.This kind of cultural bias can be seen in the comparative social capita1 studies (see OECD 
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possible to Infer出atヲ ina socie1y where CSOs score high SISラ theyare relatively "enjoying円 toexe口
their influence. 
Another goal of this paper is to explore the meaning of SIS when we examine the 
relationships between each country's SIS and related variables. This a技emptmakes important 
theoretical contributions to comparative empIrical studies in the future3. 
Let us look at some variables related to SIS (SIS (mean) in each coun位y，SIS (mean) 
r白lkings，出epercentage of organizations that think they have influence， etc.) and the overview of the 
countries surveyed. 
Table 1 clearly shows that economic health (GDP per capita) and the level of political and 
social freedom (Freedom House ratings) are not reflected in SIS. In other wordsラwhilesuch indicators 
in Russia (Moscow) and the Philippine (Manila) are lower compared to that of any other developed 
countries'， the SIS in these coun甘les紅ehigher than that of developed countries'. The levels of 
political and social freedom are high in developed countries (Germanyラ SouthKorea， and Japan)ラbut
they are not necessarily reflected in出elevel of SIS. The rate of volunteer participation and NGO 
vitality may affect SIS， but the data is only pa抗ial，thus not defmite. 
2002 and Putnam ed. 2002)‘By using the Japanese and Korean survey data， Ch∞and Tsujinaka (2004) has conducted a 
systematic analysis on the factors that influence S1S. The variables used in this paper are based on their analysis. As we see in 
the chiωsquare test conducted in the latter sectIon of the pa戸r，SIS and "Policy Influence: Success in Formulating Policy" 
show statistical significance (level of significance 0.01) in al countries surveyed. As for the relationships between S1S and 
"Policy Influence: Success in Bl∞kingllミevisingPolicy，" while the results in the Philippines (significance probability 0.074)， 
China (0.043)， and South Korea (0.015) are rather weak， we find it statistically significant (level of signi五回nce0.01) in other 
countnes 
3 How to measure“influence" of groups has been a difficult crux in the interest group studies. Most of the literature adopted 
case studies， not survey questions (s回 Baumgarむlerand Leech 1998: 128-139). ln this context， we can∞ntribute 
theoretically by identifying the si伊 ificanceof SIS. 
????? 。
TABLE 1. Overview of Countries Surveyed in J1GS (capitaJ city dataり
GDP Fr官edom CNSP Volunt巴eringNGO Su柑ediveSInuf何1ClEGItiCve 号も
per House (CSS) Worばorce Vitality lnfluence of 
Capita (n.l) rating (n.l) (n.2) (n.2) (n.3) Score Score (SIS) SIS strひng(n.4) 
(SIS) (n. 4) ranking Cn.4) 
Germany 22，740 1-1 5.9% 10% 2.23 3 47.6 
Japan 34，010 1-2 4.20/0 0.50/0 Low 1.52 5 16.0 
South Korea 9，930 ト2 2.4% 3% High 1.74 4 17.4 
Turkey 2，490 3-3 0.82 7 8.6 
RussIa 2，130 6国5 2.60 2 63.3 
Philippine 1，030 2-3 1.90/0 6% High 2.74 62.3 
China 960 7-6 Low 1.01 6 9.5 
U.S. 35.400 1-1 9.8% 220/0 
Brazil 2，830 2-3 1.6% 6% 
Bangladesh 380 4-4 High 
(n. 1) Freedom in the跨匂rld2005; (n.2) Johns Hopkins CNSP針'Oject;(n.3) Shigetomi 204; (n.4) JIGSJぐTsujinakaproject) 
* 1neach coun町f，the data was col∞ted in the capital and more than one other region. But in this papeτ， we used the 
data of the capital only 
1. Methodology and Hypotheses: 
Methods， Scope， and the Meaning of JIGS Survey， and Hypotheses Examined in this Paper 
Before going into further analyses， let us frst explain our survey project， The Internationαf 
Sun勾ノザCivilSociety and Interest Groups (hereafter “JIGS survey，" which originally st釦 dsfor 
Japan Interest Group Survey) that provides the data for出ispaper's analyses4. 
1) The main characteristic of the methodology and scope of JIGS is出atit cross-culturally survevs 
diJJ!ctlv the basic core (associations: their resources‘atむibutes、behaviors‘relations、etc.)of civil 
societv in 10 countries~ Although "associations are an essential pa口-and perhaps the least 
controversial p訂t-of civil society" (Schwartz and Pharr 2003: 32)， itis quite rare to fmd researches 
other than JIGS that systematically and comparatively sぽveyassociations exclusively. This may be 
4 Regarding the methodology and outpu岱 ofInternabonaiIGSmweys，se T511FIlaka2003，TsuHIlaka ed2002，Tsl1Mmka 
and Yeom eds. 2004， and Kojima印 dTsujinaka 2003. See also Table 2 in出ispaper for other 児島rences.
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because it is quite daunting to臼rgetappropriate research subjects and ca汀Yout large-scale surveys in 
many countries.5 
Unlike surveys出atfocus on institutional and economic statistical data like the J ohns 
Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project led by Salamon (with Anheier 1997， with Anheier， 
Regina and Wojciech 1999)， or individual survey da鵠 likePutnam and OECD Social Capital group，6 
dle JIGS survevs focus exclusivelv on each countrvラsCSO survev data. This allows us for the first 
time to comprehensivelv又rasp出equantitv‘attributes、resources、behavior，and relations of CSOs in 
出ecountries surve、red.
There is no doubt that defming and empirically grasping CSOs are difficult. However， itis 
impossible to understand the characteristics of social capital and civil society without understanding 
出e伊 antity，attribuおs，resources， behavior， and relations of CSOs. 
Putnam (1993， 2000) uses v紅白tyof aggregate dataラ butdoes not conduct surveys to也e
associations (except other objects， like citizens and local governments)， thereforeラ donot have 
essential data on organizations' behaviors and relations. In Japan， the research headed by Yamauchi 
(eds. with Ib凶ci2005) systematically examines CSOs， but his group's focus is on nonprofit 
organizations (hereafter NPOs)，出us，出escope is limited. Also the data is mainly弓U組長路tive.
The JI GS surveyラ onthe other hand， ismore comprehensive. Its goal is to cover al 
associations and unions except the govemment (由estate)， private business (血emarket)ラandfamilies. 
More specifically， !ye focus on al non-只ovemmental、private‘ independent、andvoluntarv social 
or問 nizationsthat are established enough to have a phone lin~. (In case where identification of 
organization by phone book classifications is difficult， we relied on comprehensive lists complied by a 
certain sector or by the govemment. See note 4) 
Our definition does not include "non-profit-distributing" element covered in Salamon et al's 
definition (Salamon and Anheier 1997， e.g.). Cooper幼児 organizationsand some non-govemmental 
organizations (NGOs)血at泊ke出eform of a for-profit ente早口seare important parts of也eentire 
CSOs. However， if出iselement is included，出eyare automatically classified as enterprises. Therefore， 
we exclude the “nOIトprofit-distributing"element in our defmition as well. 
Like Salamon， however， we exclude religious worship organizations. We include CSOs出at
紅ereligious， but not worship. On the other hand， while Salamon includes public ente叩risessuch as 
hospitals， private schools， and social welfare institutions， we believe註lat也ey紅emore of a public 
organization， or a hy brid of govemment and enterp丘se，ra出er出ana CSO. Thus， we exclude such 
5 There are several good∞mparative studies but their methods are more descriptive and their data are rather non-systemic. 
See PU凱ameds. 2002 and Shigetomi ed. 2002. 
6 They， originally using variety of association data， finally decided to utilize questionnaire opinion surveys targeting 
individuals not groups like Wor1d Value Survey， EuroBarometer and AsiaBarometer. See OECD 2002， Howard 2003， 
Inoguchi 2002， and Inoguchi et al.eds.2005. 
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organizations from our definition. 
Consequently， .salamon 's statistical data grasos civil societv bv focusing orimarilv on 
I10Iトorofitsector or service establishment、whilethe JIGS data outs more weight on associations and 
umons. 
As Table 2 shm，vs， we have surveyed 10 countries in出efrst round of JIGS， and the da臼 of8
countries are currently available. Since these countries surveyed are quite diverse in terms of出e
quanti句"attributes， resources， behavior， and relations， our project easily passes one of the criteria， set 
by the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Projectラwhichis “to select a set of countries出at
differed enough along key dimensions to allow us to test some of major出eoロesin this field." (Center 
for Civil Society Studies n.d.) 
As also shown in Table 2， survey methods differ slightly in countries to countries， hence， we 
need to understand出at血ismight somewhat affect the results of the survey. JIGS surveys include 
many questions and variables. But the 7・countrycomparison conducted in血ispaper relies on 
variables used in detailed Japan-Korea SIS study， which has already been completed (Choe and 
Tsujinaka 2004). 
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TABLE 2. Overview of JIGS 10 Country Surveys 
? ? ? ?
Coun句r Year 
Data Source / Survey 
Population Sam(a) ple 
Valid Response Return Rate Regions @Principal Survey Researcher 
Method (b) (%) (b/a) (Valid Retum Sample) /Notel Codebook References. etc. 
l.Japan 97 
classified telephone 
23，128 4，247 1，635 38.5 Tokyo (1，438) @ TSUJINAKA， Yutaka 1 
directory 1 mail Ib訂aki(19η Tsujinaka 1999a; Tsujinaka 2002 
@YEOM， Jaeho 112 organizations 
classified telephone Seoul (371) 
removed since unable to identi今
2.Korea 97 1，521 3，890 493 12.7 regional classifications: 481 
directory / mail Kyonggi (110) 
organizations / Tsujin誌aI999b;
Ts竺Iil!_a_I¥:aand Yeom 2004. 
@TSUJ応JAKA，Yutaka 1 
classified telephone 
Washington， D.C. 80rganizぬonsadded from 
3.USA 99 7，228 5，089 1，492 29.3 (748) preliminary survey: 1500 directory / mail 





4. Germany 。 directoη" organization 4，806 3，074 885 28.8 
Halle (154) 
TSUBOGO， Minoru 1 Tsujinaka 
directory / mail 2001b 
“Social Groups" 
、Oト02，officially registered at Beijing (62η， @LIii，nJaikrIagP2I0le0g5，b Yk UANヲRuijun1 
出eMunicipal or 9，536 8，897 2.858 32.1 Xianju (1，782)， Tsujinaka 2005b. Kojima and 
5.China 
、03働04
Dis位ict/Coun句， Civil Heilongjiang (449) Tsujinaka 2003，2004. 
Affairs Bureau / mail 
Regional survey 
@HIRAI，Yl山 ko，KANSU， Aykut 1 
6. Turkey 
03 -1 investigation based on 
15，730 Appr. 841 Ankara ( 334 ) telephone directory Ankara ~4 telephone directory 1 1，500 
同
Istanbul ( 507 ) 
mtervlew 
(4512 )Istanbul ( 11218) 
Registered Organization Moscow (411) 
@ SMIRNOV， William / Able to 
7.Russia 、03-04
(NGO) Database / mail 
2，974 1，500 711 47.4 
Saint Petersburg (300) 
contact 1893 organizations out of 
2974/Is_ujinaka 2005a 
Securities and Exchange 
@BALLESCAS， Maria Rosario・
Piquero， SHUTO， Motoko 1 
8.Philippine 、04-05
Commission (SEC)， 
44，051 5.472 1，014 18.5 Manila (855) sanlpled only organizations with a 
Philippine Foundation Cebu (159) 
phone number / Ballescas， Shuto， Center (PFC) 1 interview 
and Tsujinaka 2006 
Brazilian Institute of 
3，000 1，500 50 Brasilia，Recife，Belem 
9.Brazil 、05劃06 Geography and Statistics 275，895 @KONDO， Edson Kenji 
(IBGE) / inter"ie'W 
(estimate) (estimate) (estimate) (Belo Horizonte) 
10.Bangladesh 同6-07 Telephone books， TBC 1500 800 50 Dhaka， Rajshahi @TASNIMヲ Farhat， SHAKILラDirectories I (estimate) (estimate) (estimate) Ahmed. 
2) Next， we wiU briefly introduce various hypotheses that will be examined in more details 
Iater.7 
① Civil Society Structure (sector proportion) Hypothesis 
The s位uctureof C SOs varies in each coun位y，since it reflects distinctive history， culture， and 
S匂te鍋societyrelations. This hypothesis ar忠IeSthat the struc知re，or sector proportion of CSOs， 
explains the d.iferences in SIS in each co阻むy.In order to test出ehypo出eSlSラwe. fust need to 
investigate which sector is highly organized by CSOs by comparing four sectors: profit， 
nonprofitラ citizen，and other. This reveals the characteristics and佐endsof each sector. If the 
dmerences in the propo抗ionof sectors explain也edmerences in SIS， then the implication 
would be that power or policy influence does not directly affect SIS. 
② Resource Hypothesis 
This hypothesis s回tes血atdifferences in objective resources such as organizational resources 
and也eyear established of CSOs in each coun往yexplain the dmerences in SIS. We compare 
the basic resources of org釦 izationsin four sectors. The reason why we exanlIne the year CSOs 
訂eestablished is because it can be considered as a comprehensive indicator that shows the 
wealth (durability) of resources. The ass山nptionis出atthe longer a CSO has existedラthemore 
it is likely to have durable and abundant resources. In other words， unless a CSO has plenty of 
resources， itcould not have existed for a long time. 
③ Political Activism Hypothesis 
This hypo血esisstates that SIS is a function of aggressive activities of CSOs. In other words， 
policy activism determines SIS. If this hypothesis is validラSIScan be considered as a reflection 
ofCSOs' policy influence. 
④ Administration Connection Hypothesis 
This hypothesis suggests血atSIS is a function of mutual relations between CSOs and 
administrative actors， or出esむengthof institutional relations. It overlaps with the above 
Political Activism Hypothesis， and cannot be clearly separated because both put emphasis on 
actors' behaviors based on relations. This hypothesis is related to the characteristics of political 
systems (regimes) such as statism and corporatism. 
(Orientation Hypothesis) 
7 See Muram副社 Itoh，mdhlijimK81986¥Tstlimb1988for the alit}10r's original ideas ForMhcr th∞附ical
maiysls，see Frethgis 1974，sct1102IlmmdTICmey1986，KIIOK199o，and Walker 1991. 
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Differences in subjective orientations such as aims and ideologies of CSOs may explain the 
di宜erencesin SIS.ηlere are other possible hypotheses， but these wiI1 be discussed in other 
paper. 
3) Method of Analysis 
There are basically血reemethods: 
① Examine the relations (whether liner or non-liner) between each coun句，'sSIS and related 
variables after checking scatter diagrams for出evariables白atshow signific組 ce.The 
relationships cannot be considered as causal， but we consider it as an inference. 
② Examine the relations between selected variables and SIS in cross-tabulation analysis in 
each coun的，釦d白ldstatistical significance through chi-square tests. 
③ Examine the relations between selected variables and SIS in each sector (profit， nonprofit， 
citizen， and other) of each coun位ym也ecross-tabulation analysis. Find statistical significance 
仕立oughchi叫 uaretests. 
Evenぜ we白ld釦 inferencefrom test①， results in② and ③ are stil independent. 
However， ifwe could pass al the tests， the inference regarding the relationships between SIS 
and certain variables may be one step closer to establishing causal relationships. 
Although more systematic multivariate analysis is required since SIS in each country 
is a product of more multidimensional variables， such analysis will not be covered in this 
paper. (For a detailed comp訂ativeanalysis of Japan and Korea， see Choe and Tsujinaka 2004.) 
We now t江nto each hypothesis in more details. 
1. Civil Society Structure (sector proportion) Hypothesis 
The s加 C凶reof CSO， or a proportion of various sectors， isaffected by each coun町 's
distinctive history， institutional legacies， and path dependence. This is why itis difficult to 
create a common classification for CSOs出atcan be used in cross-natIonal survey s. In出every 
f江stJIGS survey conducted in Japan， we asked the respondents to choose one from ten 
classifications. In出esurveys that followed， we have臼iloredthe question to each coun町's
situations. As a result， the number ranges from 4 in China to 32 in Russia (see Appendix A). 
However， we have designed the question in such a way that made it possible to 
compare classifications among countries. In order to make comparisons easier， we have adopted 
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4 sector c1assifications (profit， nonprofitラ citizen，and other (N.E.C.， or Not Elsewhere 
Classified) here in this paper. 
The "Profit sector" includes economic organizations that have strong ties to 
agricultural， fores往y，fishing， and manufacturing industries， as well as labor and employers 
organizations. The "Nonprofit sector" inc1udes organizations that provide professional services 
related to professionalラ educational，researchラwelfare，medicalラandadministrative issues. The 
"Citizen sector" is composed of organizations that cItizens can participate as an individual. They 
include organizations related to politics， citizens， religion， and sportslhobby “O出er"includes 
organizations出atdo not fit into the above three sectors， and a1so those voluntarily chose to be 
m出iscategory in the questionnaire 8 . Profit， nonprofit， and citizen sectors very much 
coロespondwith the也reeclassifications used in Muramatsu， 1toh， and Tsujinaka (1986; 
Tsujinaka 1988) which are producer， policy taker， and advocacy.9 
。% 20先 40 % 60 % 80 % 100% 








• Profit Sector 図Non-profitSector 臼CitizenSector 口Other(N.E.C.) 
Figu問 2.The Proportion of Four Sectors in Each Countη 
8 WaJker 1993. Walker's classifications are based 00 the types of occupation， while ours are based 00 theωtegory 
names from which we asked organizations to ch∞se. 
9 The Caveat is that in China， we focused 00 social organizations only， and used classifications that are unique to 
those Chinese organizations. They are industry， professional， academic/culture， and federation. 1nthIs paper， we tried 
to∞rrespond these categories to profit， nonprofit， citizen， and other， r郎防ctively.However， there are no 
classifications that strictly represent citizen organizations in China. We acknowledge this is a problem. Moreover， 
since respondents in Russia and Turkey are allowed to choose more than one classifications， we need to be cautious 
abωt the results as well 
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Figure 2 interestingly shows that there are three distinctive clusters of countries. The 
first is the Philippines and Russia that have high SIS. The Citizen sector is the largest in these 
two countries， occupying almost 50 percent of the entire four sectors. The second cluster is 
Germany and South Korea where more than one third of organizations is nonprofit， which is the 
largest. The third is Japan and China where more than one third is profit sector organizations. In 
solidarity are re gional Turkeyヲ more也anhalf of the organizations 訂C “o也er円。~ost
associations. Turkey's classification method needs to be reconsidered). 
We find a high correlation between the proportion of the citizen sector and SIS (mean) 
(Fi伊re3-1). on the other hand， we find a reverse correlation between the profit sector and SIS 
(mean) (Figure 3-2). (We find no correlations between SIS (mean) and the nonprofit sector or 
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Figure 3-1. Citizen Sector 
10 We， however， do not infer血atthere is a causal relationship between these variables. There is no doubt that也e
st印 cture(sector proportion) may be an indicator to reveal the state幽societyrelations， but it may simply appear so on 
the surface. But as the following analysis shows， the organizations in the citizen sector are active， and hen∞， ¥ve 
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Figure 3・2.Profit Sector 
Analyzing SIS by sector， SIS (mean) of the citizen sector is the highest among four 
sectors in South Korea and Japan. In the Philippines and Russia， the order (from high to low) of 
the SIS (mean) is other， profit， nonprofit， and citizen. In 
(mean) of the profit sector was the highest. (See the supplementary summ出yofcoun町 analysis
in the end of也ispaper.) 
Germany， China， and Turkey， the SIS 
on the other hand， the SIS (mean) countηranking of the citizen sector is出esame as 
出atof the overall SIS ranking. To be more specificラ itwas 2.65 in the Philippines， 2.57 in 
Russia， l.96 in Germany， l.91 in South Korea， 1.56 in Jap釦， 0.99 in China， and 0.96 in Turkey. 
The ranking order of the nonprofit sector is由esame. 1n the profit sector ranking， Germany was 
ranked number one， and Turkey came in higher也知China.
It is clear也atS1S of the citizen sector and its proportion determine each counむy'sS1S. 
However、relativelvsoeakin夜、 urganizatiollS in the citizen sector iu_countries where SIS is high 
do not necessarilv self-evaluate themselves high旬、 whencompared to actors in other sectors. It 
is interesting to note the possibility that出eproportion of the citizen sector in each coun位y
(capital) and SIS of血ecitizen sector determine the overall SIS (mean). 
Where does the confidence of citizen sector organizations come企om?
8H~ 
II. Resource Hypothesis 
1) Resource盟ypothesis(A): Year Established 
Do CSOs' resources affect SIS? 
In previous studiesラ ahypothesis has been denied that an organization 's reso町 ces
would exert inf1uenceαcross difJerent sectors (see Tsujinaka 1988ヲ Muramatsu，Itoh and 
Tsujinaka 1986. Also see Choe and Tsujinaka 2004). Subjective resouτcesラsuchas“repu陪tion，"
however， are an exception because the increase of reputation is proportional to the increase in 
inf1uence. on the other handラ ithas been corrfmned白atthose with many members and 
fmancial resources generally have strong inf1uence within a certain sector (Choe and Tsujinaka 
2004~ Tsujin紘a1998; Muramatsu， ItohラandTsujinaka 1986). 
Let us examine the relationships between each country 's resources and SIS. 
Trend in Year Established and SlS 
Domestically speaking， unlike reputation， the year established， or也eage of an 
organization when the sぽveywas conducted， has been considered as a variable that may be 
related to influence. The older age may perhaps help sむengthenorganizational resources and the 
relationships between political actors， win trust， and increase inf1uence. This premise is likely to 
be valid at least within a sector (Tsujinaka 1988: 64~ Choe and Tsujinaka 2004). Here， let us 
consider whether ye紅 establishedcorrelates with SIS in al the coun位iessurveyed. 
Fi伊江e4 shows the percentage， calculated every five years， of al organizations 
established during the 100-year time (合om1900 to around 2000) in each co聞社y.ln出IS五都re，
which includes the data of 8 countries， we note也atJapan and the United States are出e
exception. In other words， in other 6 countries， most organizations were established in the late 
1980 and the 90s. 
We need to be careful， however， that there is a 7ヴGぽ gapbetween the frst s百vey
(199ηand the last one (2004)， and出atit does not include organizations白atdissolved before 
出esurvey was conducted. Another limit is出atwe cannot tel from the data whether the 
organization is entirely a new or a merged one between existing organizations. This point is 
particularly important since the change in political system (regime) often cause such 
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Year Established (every 5-years) 
* Data available until 1997 in Japan and Korea. Data available until 1999 in U.S.A. and Germany. 
(%) Figure 4. Year Established 
Due to space limitations， we could not prove our grand hypothesis， but the authors 
believe that there is a strong relationship between changes in political systems (regimes) and the 
establishment (or a bi抗h)of organizations (Tsujinaka and Yeom eds. 2004). In this sense， we can 
understand白atpostw紅 reformin Japan and the liberal reform after the Civil Rights 
Movement，or interest group liberalism in the United States (Lowi 1979)， positively a笠ectedthe 
number of organizations established. 
M勾orshifts in political systems (regimes) may have also affected the establishment of 
organizations in other coun出es.Examples of such major changes are: Postwar reform as well as 
出e1990 reunifIcation of Germany;出ecollapse of也eSoviet Union in 1991 and liberalization 
after that in Russia; the reform and liberalization policy ISouthern Tour (1992) in China; 
liberalization and civilianization since 1987 in South Korea; negotiぬonsfor EU accession (EC 
until 1987， and EU after 1993)釦 dliberalization in Turkey; and liberalization a立erthe Aquino 
regime (1983) in the Philippines. 
Again the caveat is that we survey出eyear established of only existing organizations. 
Thus， ifCSOs紅evulnerable and if出ecycle of establishment and disseverment is sho民出e
data would always show that most organizations are established in recent ye訂s.
The effects of political system (regime) change aside， we believe出at出epermanence 
of organizations is the source， the sum， and at the same time， the result of resources. Hence， if
there were more organizations with long history， we would expect them to have a strong 
inf1uence. Ai出oughJaDan、GermamヘandSouth Korea have more Dermanent or問 nizatIons‘
why do they have relatively lower SIS than Russia and the Philippines、andhigher SIS than 
Turkey and China? This is a puzzling result企om血esurvey. 
Moreover， we analyzed the correlations between SIS and也eyear established， but 
could not confmn any relationships. In other words， we infer， as a result of the test of出e
Resource Hypothesis (A)ラ出at，f!t a nationallevel、thereis no relations between SIS and the year 
established. 
Moreover， if we examine the year established in four sectors sep訂ately，we can 
conclude the followings: 
1) When compared to other sectorsラ mostof the organizations in the Citizen sector were 
established around出e1990s (Figure 5-1). However， in developed countries like the United 
States， Germany， and Japan， there訂erelatively m加 yorganizations with a long history， 
established before and after the war and in出e1960s. There are perhaps mainly two reasons 
why many organizations emerged around出e1990s: one was a political system (regime) change 
many countries went through， and the other was the overall vulnerability of CSOs. 
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2) In the Profit sector， we fmd large di笠erencesamong countries as well as in their development 
paths (Figure ι2). In developed coun甘ies，the majorities of organizations in this sector were 
created before and after ¥¥明TI，and have a long history. Many organizations were established in 
countries that went through political system (regime) changes (including Germany) and in 
developing coun廿ies(組dquite many in Germany and South Korea) since the late 1980s. 
3) The Nonprofit sector shows aむend由atfals somewhere between the Citizen and the Profit 
sectors. Here， indeveloping countries， many organizations were also established since the late 
1980s. However， inother countries， the number is spread more or less evenly in the post¥万arera. 
It出ensomewhat increases since the late 1980s in countries出atwent through political systems 
(regimes) changes. 
In 民rmsof the relationships between the ye紅 establishedand SIS (mean)， 
organizations， except for those in the Philippines， established before the w訂 untilthe mid同1960s
tend to show a rather high SIS score. 
However， when we examine the Citizen sector， newly emerging organizations 
established since the late 1980s， except for those in Germany， show higher SIS出anthe average 
score in each counむy.Such位endc自国otbe found in other sectors. This may mean that the 
Ci1:izen SectO[ shQWS hish SIS exactly because it is voung釦 denergetic. 
As discussed in the previous section， the proportion of the Citizen sector positively 
affect a count巧，'soverall SIS， but citizen organizations do not usually have a long history in加 y
coun句.What the Citizen sector can boast of is not its perm組問ce.
Rather， itis註lefact that it is emerging.百四 SISof the Citizen sector was not 
necessarily high in counむies出athad high coun的rscores. We believe也at出eyoun立citizen
sector is consequently raisin叉也eoverall score. 
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Year Established (Citizen Sector / every 5-years) 
*Data available until 1997 in Japan and Korea. Data available until 1999 in U.S.A. and Germany. 
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Year Established (Profit Sector / every 5-years ) 
*Data available until 1997 in Japan and Korea. Data available until 1999 in U.S.A. and Germany. 
Year Established: Profit Sector Figure 5-2. 
Table 3 summarizes the result of the cross-tabulation analysis (chi-square test)ラ
exammmg the relationships between the year established and SIS. We fmd the level of 
significance of the analysis (0.05) in RussiaヲGerman)らandJapanラbutoverall weak. Moreover， 
出ecoe汀icientwas negativ~ (i.e.， newer organizations showed a high level of significance， the 
opposite result expected from the hypothesis). 
TABLE 3. Summary of Cross-Tabulation Analysis: Resou民e-Year EstabIished 
Country with significαnce 




Variables: Countrv Name (n.l) PhIRIGIKIJ/CII CN and Sector (n.2) P，NP，C、O
Year Established: R*G*戸 (n.3) G:P，cl J:oよR:C (n.4) 
(n.l) Ph: Philippinel R: Russia /G: Gennanyぽ:KorealJ: Japan/C: ChinaIT: Turkey 
(n.2) P: Profit sectorl NP: Non-profit sector/ C: Citizen sector/O: Other， Not elsewhere classified. 
(n.3)付:under level of significance of 0.0 1 ト underlevel of significance ofO.05. 
(n.4) capita11etters= under the level of significance of 0.05; smallletters=under the level of significance of 0.10. 
2) Resource Hypothesis (B): Organizational Resources 
Cross-tabulation analysis (countries and sectors) and SIS 
To fmd out the relationships between SIS and organizational resources， we have 
conducted cross“tabulation analyses for each coun位yand sector. However， we cannot fmd any 
relations in any of the reso町cesbecause the results are ei出erinsign正Icantor confusing. 
As Table 4 shows， cross-tabulation analy sis of resources (coun町Isector)and SIS did 
not yield any significant results. We even found completely opposite results from what the 
hypo也esispredicted. In countries where there紅emany citizen organizations (philippines)ヲnew
organizations with small resources showed high SIS. 
In sum， neither comprehensive resources such as也eye紅 establishednor也e
organizational resources just examined c但motconfmn白esignificance wi出 SIS.
This result may not be surprising. First of a1ラ出esize of resource does not tel us how 
much of it can actually be mobilized for affecting political processes. 
Moreover， since SIS is a self.幽evaluationof one 'sown organization in policy making or 
political processes， itis easy to imagine that the following issues also matter: the context of 
policy and political process; relative relations and evaluations with other actors; and 
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institutional context of organization in society. No ma抗erhow abundant the resources are， an 
organization c出motattain high SIS， if the rival organizations or other actors have more 
resources. 
If resources do not affect SIS， then what other factors will? 
We wiU next examine the behavior of CSOs in political processes. 
TABLE 4. Summary of Cross-Tabulation Analysis: Organizational Resource 
Variables Countrv Name (Ph/RJG町 JICrru) CN and Sector (P，NP，Cβ) 
Member (individual) No significance 
Member (organizational) N 0 significance 
Personnel Ph帥，RぺG叫
Significant but not linear 
(Correlation unclear) 
Finance G料 Tu"'*
Turkey (and Philippines) 
Significant but not liner 
(Correlation unclear) 
Nat'l Gov't Subsidy No significance found 
Notes: same as TABLE 3. 
日'.Political Activism Hypothesis 
No sI伊lificance
No significance 
No significance， but 
higher SIS confmned 




Since we cannot fmd也erelationships be肌'eenresources and SIS， we wilI now focus 
on CSOs' various activities. 
As Table 5 shows， 8 activity variables of CSOs are expected to show quite strong 
correlations with SIS in each coun町 andsector. Among others，出esevariables include: contact 
with potItical parties; support election campaign， influence budget formation; contact rnass 
media， and lobbying (general) 
on the other hand， the relationship between cou出 ySIS and each variable could be 
linear or non-linear. We have picked up those血atshowed 1inear relation~ only， or those that are 
correlated and maybe able to make causal inference. 5 figures (Fi思re6-1 to Figure 6-5) are 
then created. 
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T'AHLE_S~ Sl!mmlII'Y_2f C_r(}ss..Tltb_l!lation Analysis: Activities and Performance 
Coun句r that showed Sector that showed in Linearity 
significance in Cross- significance in respective 
Tabulation coun住y
Variables Name: PhIRIGIKJJ/ClTu Sectors: P.NP.C‘O 
Pol. Lobbying to Ph**R**GネキK本*J**C料 Tu**Ph:P，NP，C，O/G:NP，C，OIJ:P，NP，C，O 
The Governments R: P，NP，CIT:O Linear 
Contact N ational R *本G**K**J**Cキ* G:P，NP，C，OIJ:P，NP，C，O Semi四Linear
Adminis仕ation R: P，NP，CIT:P，O (ph out) 
Contact Gov.Par匂 R*牢G料 K**J料 C村 G:C，OIK:NPIJ:P，NP，C，OIC:NP，C，O
(Non-linear Ph4.4%;R17.4%;G15.4%; R: NP，CIT:Cラo Non-Linear 
K23.1 %;J17.3%;C33.5%;Tu5.6%) 
Contact Oppo.Party R本*G*本K牢J料 C本* G:C，OIK:NP，CIJ:P，NP，C，OIC:P，NP，C，O 
R: P，NP，CIT:NP，C，O Non圃Linear










Lobbying Total Ph料 R**G**K内料CキTu** G:P，C，OIK:NP/J:P，NP，C，OI 








Policy Formulation Ph**R**G料 K**J料 C料 Tu**Ph:C/G:NP，C，O反対PIJ:P，NP，OIC:C，O 
Policy Performance R: P，NP，CIT:NP，C Linear 
Policy BlokinglRevising R料 G料 K*J**C吋il* Ph:C/G:NP，C，O/J:PラNP，OIC:C
Policy Performance R: P，NP，CIT:NP，C，O Semi-Linear 
(Ph out) 
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Figure 6・1. Relation between Political Lobby and SIS (mean) 
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Figure 6-3. Relation between Campaign Activities and SIS(mean) 
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Figu民 ι5.Relation between Policy Performance (Blocking/Revising)組 dSIS (mean) 
Let us examine 5 sca仕erdiagrams. These are relatively speaking， strong linear 
relations出atalso show significant correlations between SIS (mean) in each coun町 and
variables. We do not conduct multivariate analysis here， but the fact出at(more than) 3 out of 8 
variables (activities) examined， and 2 variables related to policy performance suggest也atthese
variables show strong relationship with SIS. 
The frst three variables訂e:
Lobby the Administration through Politicians (Political Lobby) 
Provide Information to the Mass Media (Media Lobby) 
Participate in Election Campaigns (Campaign Activities) (5 types) 
Each variable indicates aggressive activities toward the govemment， the mass media， 
and political parties. 
As for politicallobby (Figure ふり， China and Turkey are outliers in the lower right. As 
for the media lobby (Figure 6・2)，the Philippines， and in c出npaignactivities (Fi伊re6・3)，
Germany are clearly an outlier in也eupper left. 1t is interesting to note that these suggest出e
characteristics of the relations between CSOs in each counむyand political actors. 
As a result of these aggressive activities， performance variables (policy formulation 
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and policy blocking/revising) show clear correlations (Fi伊re6-4 and Figure 6-5). In both 
instances， the Philippines is somewhat an outlier. Except for the Philippines， we rmd that生豆
iarger the proportion of organizations successful in formulatin位、 revlsm豆、fJldblocking policies、
白ehigher出eSIS:_SIS in the Philippines is high although there is no evidence of activities or 
policy performances examined here. 
Let us go back to Table 5. 
Every country seems to show statistical significance in the chi幽squaretest in each 
sector， but if we look closer， countries can be divided into two or出reegroups. 
The following is the number of variables出atshowed significance at a nationallevel: 
Japan 10 variables， Germany 9 variables， South Korea 9 variables， China 9 variables， Russia 
8 variables， Turkey 5 variables， and the Philippines 4 varIables. 
As for sectors: 
Japan 10 variables， 34sectors， Germany 10 variables， 25sectors， 
Turkey 9 variables， 17sectors， Russia 8 variables， 23sectors， 
South Korea， 6variables， 8sectors， China 5 variables， 11sectors， and 
the Philippines 3 variables， 6sectors. 
For example， according to也ecross-tabulation analysis， the relationships between 
policy success and SIS are statistically signific組 t，al出oughthe level varies according to 
coun甘ies.The relationships were especially clear in the case of Germany， Japan， and China， 
while slightly weaker in South Korea and the Philippines， and even weaker in Turkey and 
Russia (significant probability of chi-square記st).When each sector is examined， we fmd 
statistical significance in Germanv and J apan、butthe significance is generallv lower in other 
countries. 1I 
As the quan封切tivesummary suggestsラ inestablished liberal democratic systems like 
Japan and Germany， the relationships between lobbying and in:fluence訂eclear at national and 
sector levels. In other coun位ies，statistical significance declines especially in sectors. It 
tendency is found not just in Russia， Turkey， Chinaラandthe Philippines， but also in South Korea. 
The level of the maturity in the political processes， which has liberal democratic characteristics， 
between developed and developing countries may reflect these differences. 
1 In Germany， we find statistical significance in the nonprofit， citizen， and other s∞tors， and in Japan， profit， 
nonprofit， and other sectors. on the other hand， statistical significance was confirmed only in two sectors in Russia 
(profit and citizen)， South Korea (nonprofit and others)， China (other [federation] and citizen [academic組 dculture])， 
and Turkey (nonprofit and citizen) 
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v. Administration Connection Hypothesis 
Organizations' relationships with the administration includes many issues: accreditinι 
licensingラ administrative伊 idance，policy岨formationcooperation， opinion exchange， sending 
advisoηboard member， post o:fering to the ex七ureaucrats，and so on (Table 6). 
The relationships between the national administration and SIS in each counむysuggest 
也atthere紅eno liner relations， and show some negative relations (Figure 7-1). The relations 
with local autonomies show positive but weak relations (Figure 7-2). 
We found weak liner relationships between administrative consultations and SIS， but 
the Phi1ippine case was an outlier. In other words， we expect that !nstitutional relationships with 
血eadministration would be a dilemma for CSOs' influence. The closer a CSO is to出e
administration‘the lower the SIS. 
TABLE 6. Summarv of Cross置TabulationAnalvsis: Relations with Administration 
Coun町r 出atshowed Sector that showed in Line訂ity
signi:ficance in Cross-
Tabulation 










Notes: same as TABLE 3. 
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This paper frst of al emphasizes出at0町 internationalJI GS survey is a very 
important and rare project because it comprehensively ~urvevs CSOs themselves directly、which
is the most essential element of civil society， in10 countries. This paper uses data from capi匂l
cities in 7 countries， and analyzes the Subjective Influence Scores (SIS mean加 dSIS in each 
coun町)in different sectors. 
The results of our analysis can be summarized as follows. (See Appendix B for the 
S回nmaryof∞m住yanalysis.) 
F立st，we ar思le也atthe Civil Societv Struc_tqr~Hypothesis is valig. In other words， we 
can infer出atthe proportion of the citizen sector may determine each coun町 'sSIS. The citizen 
sector's SIS is not necessarily the highest in every counむy，but it helps raise the overal1 country 
SIS 
Second， we ar釦le血atthe Resource Hvpothesis is invalid. We could not fmd 
meaningfu1 relations between organizational resources and SIS. This is because countries where 
CSOs had not enough resources (也ePhilippines and Russia) scored higher SIS than countries 
where the proportion of perm組側 CSOsis relatively large (Japan， Germany， South Korea). At 
也es紅巳e也ne，SIS is low in coun紅ieswhere most organizations are new， and had not enough 
resources (China and Turkey). The citizen sector is relatively new in most countries. In 
particular， organizations established during the transitional period tended to evaluate themselves 
more positively， and出atis why也eyhad higher SIS. 
Third. as for the relationship between lobbving and SIS、thereis an overall correlation 
which is a result of activism、andthe relationships between policv preference and SIS are also 
S紅ong.Moreover、wefound di宜erences(statistical significance) between mature liberal 
democracies like Japan and Germanv、andothers in their relations to SIS. When each sector is 
analyzed， correlations often become obvious， but no clear significance was found in白ecases of 
South Korea， China， and the Philippines. This may be related to institutional maturiザofliberal 
democracy.12 
Fourth， administrative connections， like activism， showed some correlations with SIS 
However， in terms of liner relations with SIS in each coun句"we were able to fmd such 
relations， although weak， with local autonomy and administrative consultation， but not with血e
state (national government). We assume由atthere is a complex relationship among出esta旬、
CSOs、andSIS. 
Theoretically speaking， each counむy'sSIS， which maybe determined by the number 
12 More puzzles c釦 befound here. For example， why did we find higher level of significance than expected in 
Turkey and Russia? 
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ofcitizen sectorラsproportio!! to other sectors， can be considered as an indicator of civil society 's 
influence. This indicator can aIso be considered to show aR只ressivenessof civiI societv as it 
affects (or is affected by) CSO activism and performance. 
The remaining tasks are吐lefollowing. Firstラweneed to take into consideration the 
relative s悦聞出 ofother actors surrounding CSOs such as出estate， enterprises、familv、and
religious organizations (See Tsuiinaka ed.2002‘加dShigetomi 2004). We were not able to 
analyze these in our study， but we surmise也atin a society where the citizen sector is relatively 
dominant， the strength of由es包teand the government may be weak. on the other handラ ma
society where for-profit sector organizations 訂ere1atively dominantラ thestate and白c
government may be strong. This may explain why SIS in the Philippines and Russia are higher 
出an出atof Germany， South Korea， and Japan's. It may also explain why SIS in Turkey and 
China are low.ηlere is no denying出atSIS is an indicator of state determinism and the relative 
relations with the state (similarly frrms， famil)らreligiousorganizations.) As for Russia， Turkey， 
and China， we need to explore these issues further in也efu国民.
As mentioned above， the analysis of year established reflects the changes in political 
systems (regimes). Moreover， SIS may be highぜnewlyemerging organizations feel a s位ong
sense of historical accomplishment in affecting stateωsociety relationships. 
New organizations do not have enough resources and血atmay be a negative factor for 
白e立activitiesラ buttheir asp立ationsto become more influential could work as a plus. Such 
dynamism of newly emerging organizations need to be examined in relations to other actors as 
well. This will be our future research topic. 
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Appendix A. Classification of Four Sectors 
Philippine Russia 
1 Agriculture organiation 81 0.9弘 1 Agricultural organization 41 0.4% 
2 Farmer's union 01 0.0覧 2 Economic organization 251 2.6覧
3 Eco~omic， busini.es: commercial or 301 3.5~ 3 Labor organization 441 4.6弘
Profit Sector employers organization 
4 Trade (labor) union or federation 51 0.6弘 13 T rade union 311 3.3弘
5 Educational organization 441 5.2% 4 Educational organization 103 10.8弘
6 Academic or research organization 61 0.7覧 5 Government related organization 102 10.7% 
8 Gove~nmeぱal or administration-related 161 1.9官
organlzatlOn 
6 Welfare organization 991 10.4% 
9 Welfare organization 601 7.1% 7 Professional organization 521 5.5% 
Non-profit 10 Philanthropy organization 71 0.8% 17 Organization on health care issues 111 1.2% 
1 Professio~al organization (health， medical、 341 4.0~ 20 Publishing activities 01 0.0% 
legal. etc.) 
22 Organization on legal education 01 0.0% 
23 Organization on science development 01 0.0% 
7 Cultural organization 41 0.5見 8 Political organization 121 1.3也
12 Polttical or public af千airsorganization 91 1.1弘 9 Civic organization 611 6.4弘
13 People's organization or NGO 230 27.1覧 10 Ecological organization 221 2.3也
15 Religious organization 131 15.4覧 1 Female organization 321 3.4弘
16 R母creationalor hobby or sport organization 211 2.5% 
12 NGO for protecting right of different social 132 13.9弘
groups 
14 Local sel←govemlng 81 0.8% 
15 Special interest groups， nobbies 211 2.2弘
Citizen 
16 Charity organization 132 13.9% 
18 Organization on consumers rights 01 0.0% 
19 Organization on cultural questions 311 3.3% 
21 Organization on children rights 211 2.2弘
24 Peace organization 21 0.2% 
28 Organization on sport and cultural events 01 0.0% 
29 Organization on human protection 01 0.0弘
300rganiza士.ionon spiritual development 01 0.0% 
31 Religious organizatio円 21 0.2% 
14 Foreign or intemational organization 1 0.1% 25 Organization on national/ ethnic issues 21 0.2% 
96 Other， (SPECIFY) 242 28.5% 26 O:ganization on migration policy and 
mlgrants 1 0.1% 
27 Organization on international cooperation 31 0.3% 
98 Other 01 0.0% 
。出er(NEC)
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Germany Korea Japan 
1 Agriculture 21 0.3弘 1 Agricultural 131 3.7見 1 Agricultural 351 2.5弘
2 Economic organization 371 6.2弘 2 Economic 391 11.0弘 2 Economic 273 19.5% 
Pro缶tSector 
3 Union 81 1.3% 3 Labor 141 4.0% 3 Labor 110 7.8% 
16 Agri. Fisherγ. Fonrestry-related 111 0.8弘
17 Commerce & Industry-related 681 4.8% 
4 Educational organization 681 11.4弘 4 Educational 301 8.5% 4 Educational 123 8.8弘
5 Social welfare 881 14.7弘 5 Administration 171 4.8% 5 Administration 136 9.7% 
6 Professional organizatior 631 10.6弘 6 Social Wealfare 511 14.4% 6 Social Weal匂re 851 6.1見
7 Professional 481 13.6見 7 Professional 135 9.6% 
Non-profit 18 Public Wealfare 261 1.9% 
7 Political or匹anization 271 4.5% 8 Political 91 2.5日 8 Political 291 2.1% 
8 Sport. hobby. recreation 140 23.5出 9 Citizen 281 7.9日 9 Citizen 601 4.3% 
10 Religious 351 9.9見 11 Sports 401 2.9弘
14 Convivial 171 1.2% 
15 Religious 121 0.9% 
19 NGO 251 1.8% 
Citizen 
9 Other 164 27.5弘 1 Other 691 19.5% 10 Nonpro朽t 147 10.5見
12 ~cademic/Research/ Art/Cultur 
al 
401 2.9% 
13 lntemational Exchange 161 1.1% 
20 Foreign Govemment 41 0.3話
21 Science 81 0.6% 
Other (NEC) 22 Taxation 31 0.2見
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]1 China I1 
Turkey U.S.A. 
2 Jndus廿y 225 38.2覧 1 Agriculturaf 0.3封 2 Agricultural 1 1.5% 
2 Economic 21 0.6% 9 Labor Union or Federati 281 3.9% 
3 Labor 0.3% 
14 ~rade or ~~siness or 125 17.5% 
Profit Sector Commercial 
7 Professional 271 7.5% 
3 Professional 134 22.8% 4 Educational 441 12.2% 1 Academic or Research 591 8.3% 
5 Administration 0.3% 4 Educational 131 18.3% 
6 Social Wealfare 481 13.3九 7 ?~v~r~~n~1 or Public Administration 141 2.0九
8 Health or Medical 481 6.7九
Non-pro行t 13 Social Welfare 371 5.2% 
1 Academic/ 135 22.9% 8 Political 0.3% 3 Cultural 1 1.5% 
Culture 9 Citizen 151 4.2% 5 Environmental 151 2.1話
10 Religious 101 2.8% 10 Political or PublicAffairs 471 6.6% 
1 Re~reatjonal or Hobby 
or Sports 
81 1.1% 
12 Religious 301 4.2% 
Citizen 
4 Federation 95 16.1% 1 Other 211 58.4% 6 ~o.relgn Interest or 
Ethnir. 10 1.4% 
15 Other 141 19.7九
Other (NEC) 
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Appendix B. The Supplementary Summary of Country Analysis 
The following is a brief summary of each coun汀y's characteristics in出eJIGS sur、匂-
We will s回口froma country出atscored the highest SIS (mean) 
1) Ihe PhiliDDinef The Philippines scores highest in SIS (mean)出anany other countries 
About 50 percent of al the organizations are in the citizen sector as in the case of 
Russia. SIS of the citizen sector is出elowest of al the four sectors examined in the 
Philippines. However， when it is compared to也atof other countries， the citizen 
sector SIS is the highest. The proportion of the profit sector is the smallest in al the 
coun仕iessurveyed. Some organizations in the profit sector were established in the 
late 1980s. Organizations in the citizen sector， on the other hand， were mostly 
established in recent years. We fmd出atsome new and small citizen sector 
organizations had high SIS. Relations were confmned between SIS on the one hand 
and political activities such as election campaigns， lobbying， and policy performance 
on the other. However， when these relations are compared to也atof other coun仕ies'， 
SIS and those activities do not show s仕ongrelations. Moreoverう whilethe 
relationships between organizations and the administrations seem to be expanding， 
consultations have not increased. We infer也at出eorganizations in the citizen sector， 
especially newly emerging ones， feel that they are influential because of the 
momentum and vigor they have. 12ut generallv speakin宮、 wefmd weak relations 
between the amount of activities and SIS. The subiective foundation of their 
influence is also weak:. The reasons may be weak relations with other actors，釦 d
especially Philippine's“we誌 S旬te(government)." 
2)旦旦怒i盆 Russiascores the second highest SIS (mean).ηle citizen sector covers 50 
percent， nonprofit 40 percent， and the profit sector， only 10 percent of al the 
organizations. Domestically， SIS of the citizen sector ranks bottom among出efo民
but internationally，出escore is the second highest. In general， many organizations， 
including profit and citizen， were established in出e1990s， and we assume that血e
impact of出epolitical system (regime) ch釦 gewas quite significant. We fmd some 
new citizen organizations出athave a high SIS. In terms of the relationships 
between SIS and organizations' activities， lobbying， and policy performance， we 
find that Russia's score was about the s担neas that of Japan and Germany's. 
The relationship between activities and SIS， hence， ismuch higher th加 wehad 
expected. Organizations' relationships with the administrations have expanded to 
some extent， and their activities concerning consultation is出emost active of al the 
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countries surveyed. We infer that the newly emerging organizations in the citizen 
and nonpro五tsectors are very active， and feel that 出ey are influential. 
Institutionalization is a1so progressing to some extent. The pattern of CSO 
influence in Russia turned out to be very similar to that of the developed 
countries' than we had expected. (However， the caveat is出atin this particular 
survey， the popu1ation was relatively sma11， and it is possible出紅白eda泊 ofon1y 
elite幽typepowerful organizations were captured.) 
3) Germany: Germany scores the自立dhighest SIS (mean). The nonprofit sector was the 
largest and covers one出ird，and the citizen and other sectors cover less由加 30
percent of the organizations. The size of出eprofit sector is les出an10 percent， but 
出eSIS is the highest both domestically and intemationally. The SIS of the citizen 
sector is unexpectedly the lowest. In terms of出eye訂 establishedラ many
organizations in the profit sector were created right after the Second World War， and 
as for the citizen sector， in出e1990s. We fmd two peak wavesラ reflectingれ;vo
political system (regime) changes in也epostw紅 andwhen the unification took place. 
Many organizations established after ¥¥引TIhave a high SIS. Except for campaign 
ac註Vl註es，we find c1ear relations between SIS and activities， lobbyingラ andpolicy 
performance， and s往ongrelations behveen activities and SIS. Organizations' 
relations with the adminis往ation(national) were the weakest. Instead， the relations 
with local autonomy and the administration (policy consultations) are somewhat 
more pervasive. Overall， the relationships between the amount of activities and SIS 
釘estrong and clear， and Germany's country SIS is high among developed states. We 
infer白atvarious organization in a1 4 sectors， especially those in the profit sector， 
are feeling their influence through vigorous activities. Moreover， German 
organizations are not active in elections campaigns and have weak relations with the 
state. We surmise that German CSOs are independent from political parties and 
the administration， and that there is a dividing line between civil society and 
political society. 
4) ~outh Kore!!: South Korea has the fourth highest SIS (mean)， but the score was below 
2.0ラwhichis equivalent to "Somewhat Influential." The proportion of the nonprofit 
sector was the largest with 40 percentラand出erest was 20 percent each. SIS of血e
citizen sector was the highest in South Korea. Many organizations were established 
after也e1980s， but as for the profit sector， there is another peak in由e1960s. 
Overal， this shows出at出e1987 liberalization had quite dynamic effects. Except for 
election campaigning， SIS and activities， lobbying， and policy blocking show clear 
relations in South Korea. However， when examined sector by sector， the relations 
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generally become extremely ambiguous. (For exampleラ出erelationships between SIS 
and出efollowing variables are unclear: lobbying the adminisむationthrough 
politicians， contacting the administrationラ electioncampaign， and policy blocking). 
on the other hand， the relations between organizations and the administration both at 
national and local levels as well as consultations with these administrations have 
been quite strong. Overall， the amount of activities and SIS do not show clear 
relations. We infer出atSIS in South Korea is about average. The data suggests 
strong relations between SIS and也eadministration， but not so between SIS and 
various sectors. This precarious pa抗ernis simil紅 tothat of Chinaヲs.
5)主E盆旦:Japan ranks自立h，and has a rather low SIS (mean). The profit sector has the 
largest proportion (one third) and出isis the largest among the developed countries. 
The citizen sector， however， isthe smallest with 13 percent. Although the citizen 
sector is the smallest， SIS is the highest among al the sectors in Japan. Japan shows 
a unique pattern because many organizations were established since the end of WWII 
war until也e1960s. Many profit organizations were established right after the war 
until出e1960sラ andcitizen organizations between the 1970 and 80s. These trends 
clearly suggest political system (regime) change in出epostwar Japan. We fmd出at
many organizations established within 10 years since the end of ¥¥明TIshow high 
SIS. Also we find very clear relations between al activities， lobbyingラ andpolicy 
performance on the one h釦 d，and SIS (bo白 nationaland sector levels) on白 o出er，
thus strong relations between activities and SIS. The relationships between SIS and 
the administration are confirmed but only to some extent both at national and local 
levels. Consultations with the adminis住ationare also increasing to some extent. 
Overal， the問 lationshipsbetween the level of activities and SIS are strong and 
clear， but at the same time， it is low compared to other developed countries. We 
conclude that active organizations in the four sectors feel也eyare influentialラ but
when the level of activities is low， they do not feel so. One important characteristic 
in the Japanese case is也atthe relationships between activism and SIS are evident in 
al sectors. 
6)些i些:China ranks sixth in SIS (mean) and scored 1.0 which suggests，市ot(or h訂dly)
Influential." The臼rgetin the China survey was“social organizations" and the profit 
sector (or “Industrγ， because sector classifications訂edifferent in China，) was也e
largest with 40 percent， and the rest (“Professional，" "Academic/Cul加re，"and 
“Federations") cons註同tes20 percent each. The profit sector has the higher SIS in 
China. As for the year established， the trend is generally similar to出atof Russia and 
出ePhilippines' where m担ly were established since the 1990s. Academic 
341 
organizations (C) have been increasing since the 1970s. Except for budget activi国民
the relations between activities， lobbying， policy performance， and SIS are very 
much clear. However， when each sector is examined， relations become quite 
ambiguous (for exampleラ凶“lobbythe administration through politicians，"“contact 
the administration，"“election campaign，"剖ld"budget lobbying"). As for the 
relations with the administration (nationalぉldlocal)， consultations have very much 
advanced. Overalラtherelationships between the amount of activities and SIS are 
not司uiteclear (This result is similar to the South Korean case). We conclude 
也atSIS is low， but show strong relations with the adminisむation.Moreover， we 
could not find clear relationship between activities and sectors. We a1so need to note 
that China was not once an outlier in various analyses (However， we砲rgetedsocial 
organlzぬons，hence， itis possible也atonly organizations that have a strong 
relations with the administration have組問ered.)
η主旦些主主:Turkey has the lowest SIS (mean) among a1 the countries surveyed.“Other" 
ぬmedout to be the largest sectorラ occupyingnearly 60 percent (many are regional 
solidarity associations). Both profit and citizen sectors are smaller than 10 percent‘ 
SIS of也eprofit sector is the highest of a1 the sectors in Turkey. Many are 
established since the later half of出e1980s. As for profit organizations， many are 
established in the 1980s， but generally scattered evenly throughout the postwar eraヲ
and organizations in the citizen sector are mostly established in recent years. The 
relationships between activities (lobbyせleadministration through politicians， 
election campaign， and lobbying， policy blocking) and SIS in Turkey訂eweak. 
However， when each sector is examined， we can com1flll relations in almost a1 
variables， as was the case in Japan and Germany. As for the relationships with出e
administration， Turkish organizations have quite strong connections， while 
consultations with the adminisむationhave not progressed. Generally speaking， the 
relationships between the amount of activities and SIS are quite strong. We 
conclude出atalthough the overall SIS is low， the relations between SIS and the 
adminisむation紅estrong. We also found也atthe relations between activities and 
performances and SIS in sectors are as clear as出ecases in Germany and Japan. 
Moreover， itis interesting to note血atTurkey was never an outlier in any of the 
cross-tabulation analyses conducted. 
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16. Social Business Model for Sustainable Societies: 
Lessons from Communities in Brazil and Japan 
Part 1町
Case 5tudies in Brazil and Japan2 
Edson Kenii Kondo3 
Abstract 
ThIs second part of the two-part ar哲clepresents the results of field studies of social 
movements and communi匂initiativesin Brazil and Japan. The initiatives in the two countries 
are significantly diferent in their origins， but both are directJy linked to new and more socially 
relevant ways of producing goods. The SBMSS framework showed that江canbe useful in 
understanding how some factors can work In favor or against the sUlJggle toward sustainabH均.
While in Japan，廿leexiernal factors showed the need for change and helped the process， in
Brazil， these same factors worked in diferent ways for the traditional people of the Amazon and 
for the landless people from Southern Brazil. For the former， the combination of a long struggle， 
low popula百ondensi匂;and the national and international concern for the Amazon produced a 
defining change in the institutional background gran哲ngthem key rights to self rule. For the 
lafter， the landless people， the exiremely slow pace of change in the exiernal factors forced the 
movement to rely on a s甘onginternal organization that helped many settlements to make 
progress towards sustainability. 
会 Ar，θ'aStLJdies 1きLJkLJba26 (March 2006)， pp. 147-183 (筑波大学 F地域研究~ 26号 (2006年
3月) 147-183頁)
1 This research was partially supported by the 川I'rans-DisciplinaryResearch on Mind and Spirit for 
Sustainability Project，" the Master's Program in Area Studies， and "The State， The Civil Society， and 
Culture in Comparative Perspective" project， al from the University of Tsukuba， and by the Sanko Group. 
We are indebted to Mr. Ciro Cor・rea，Mr. Frank do Rego Campos， Mr. Antonio de Oliveira (Seu Mucura)， Mr 
Konosuke Katano， Mr. Toshiaki Fukuda， Mr. Yukio Kokubo， and many others who provided invaluable 
support to our field studies. 
2 The data and photos used in this article were collected during field visits carried out during short visits 
between March and November 2004 in Brazil and Japan. During the first mission to Brazil， this author was 
accompanied by Mr. Nobumitsu Doi， an environmental consultant， Ms. Maria Majella Rio， at the time a 
master student at the University of Tsukuba， and Mr. Yoshisuke Akimoto， at the time a master student at 
the University ofTokyo. The visits in Japan were carried out by the author and Mr. Nobumitsu Doi. 
3 Professor， Doctoral Program in Modern Cultures and Public Policy， Graduate School of Humanities and 
Social Sciences， University ofTsukuba， Japan. 
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1. The Movement of the Landless Rural Workers in Brazil4 
1.1. Introduction 
The IV[ovement of the Landless Rura1 Workers (M:ST) originated as the resu1t of severe social 
and economic conditions that required some outlet for 1andless peasants to act and attempt to 
escape仕omtheir deprived state. The MST was preceded by several peasant movements since 
the 1950s， and a series of events that took place in the late 1970s led to its creation on January 
21， 1984. 
Brazil's agriculture started a process of export oriented agricultural production in the 1970s. 
The introduction of soybean increased mechanization， which was already a首ectingcotton and 
coffee production， and as a result caused many small farmers to 10se their jobs. Also， the large 
producers expanded by displacing peasants from traditional areas of family farming. Displaced 
peasants had two options: either go to urban slums or go to agricultural frontiers deep in the 
Brazilian hinterlands. This second option was encouraged by the Brazilian government keen to 
exploit wood， metals and precious stones with the added strategic aim of populating Brazil's 
international frontiers.但arnecker，27 -9). 
In the 1ate 1970s， the petroleum boycott and other causes 1ed to industria1 crisis and 
unemployment grew in the cities. At the same time， the colonization programs in the Amazon 
were showing the first signs of failure due to lack of infrastructure， poor soil， diseases， and a new 
wave of land purchases by businessmen and multinational ∞rporations. Displaced from their 
small properties， and back 台omfailed colonization programs in the tropical hinterlands， a large 
number oflandless peasants had nowhere to go. CH:arnecker， 28-9). 
Some of the displaced peasants in the state of Rio Grande do Sul invaded the Nonoai lndian 
reservatIon located in northern Rio Grande do Sul， near the border with Santa Catarina State. 
The Kaigang Indians， justifiably concerned with the situation， decided to take action and in May 
of 1978 expelled the 1200 peasant families. The desperate families once again had nowhere to go 
and camped by the roadside in Ronda A1ta. Following a series of tense negotiations with the 
government， 118 families decided to settle in Bage， in Southern Rio Grande do Sul near the 
border of Argentina. Another 500 families decided to settle in Mato Grosso， a remote area about 
1500 km north of Ronda Alta. On September 7， about 110 of the remaining 500 families who did 
not a∞ept the previous offers (arguing that these 10cations were improper for agriculture) 
invaded the Sarandi Fazenda， a large allegedly unproductive private property. ln spite of police 
pressure， they resisted eviction and after tense negotiations， the Governor自nallyauthorized 
them to stay in the land. This historic victory sparked severa1 other su∞essful invasions， which 
led to the creation ofthe MST on January 21st， 1984. CH:arnecker 31・38).
4 Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (MST). 
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Figure 1 -Views of the Eldorado do Sul Camp5 in Arroyo dos Ratos， in the state of Rio 
Grande do Sul 
In two decades of existence， MST has settled 1.3 m辻honpeople， which has dramatically 
changed the hfe prospects of otherwise hopeless， exploited， and landless peasants of Brazil. 
1.2. A Typical Settlement: The Assentamento Trinta de Maio 
A typical settlement is comprised of about 30 to 50 families. Generally， these families 
already share some common bond built during the period of camping6 and are the result of 
affinities such as common geographic origin， shared cultures and values， or similar expectations 
on how they want to organize their future settlements. 
The size of the plot each family receives varies from about 8 to 25 hectares depending on the 
5 The camp is the first stage when landless people occupy unused private or public land to apply pressure 
on the government and request the distribution of land to them. 
6 The camping is the initial stage， when the landless invade an unproductive private property or public land 
to pressure the government to solve their plight. This is a period in which they stay under makeshift plastic 
tents， under severe conditions of survival and the constant threat of eviction from police or hired gunmen. 
Due to such threats， itis rare for a c回npto stay long in one geographicallocation， moving from place to 
place depending on the circumstances. This camping stage usually lasts about 2 to 3 years， but there are 
cases in which this stage has continued for longer periods offive years or more. For instance， a young 
member of MST from Sergipe state mentioned that they were entering the seventh ye町 ofcamping. 
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region and the quality of the land. A∞ording to active members of the movement， there is a 
minimum size below which a family cannot be sustained. A∞ording to their past experience， 
plots that are too small have led settlements to fa註.
Several settlements were visited in Brazil but due to the restricted scope of this article we 
will focus on the case of the Ass.θntamento7 ，]}inta de Mai・'0(hereinafter referred to asτhnta de 
Maio). The Trinta de Maio is located in the municipality of Charqueap_as， about 50 km west 
from Porto Alegre， the capital city of the Rio Grande do Sul state. The settlement can be 
reached after traveling the日nal9 km on a dirt road. 
The fight for the settlement started 18 years ago， in 1987. Brazil was stil fresh out of 
the m出taryεovernment，and the Minister of the Agrarian Reform at the time was the 
notorious politician Jader Barbalho. The President at the time， Jose Sarney， had promised 
the settlement of 1 million landless families， and expectations were high. 
During the initial three years， the people who came to form the Trinta de Maio were 
part of a group of about 700 families fighting for the right to live and work. Over the course 
of several years， they occupied 15 different areas and built tempora巧Tcamps eveηtime 
Given that these occupations of private or public land were done without the a広reementof 
the property owners or local authorities， the families were expelled either by the police， by 
the gunmen hired by the property owners， or both. In May 1989， the camp they had invaded 
suffered the toughest police sieεe which lasted 30 days. According to Leonir， who 
participated in these occupations， some of their friends were killed and mothers lost their 
unborn babies due to attacks by poisonous products sprayed by airplanes and helicopters 
Leonir， who treated us with a healthy dinner during our stay in their settlement， could 
barely recall these episodes because they caused him so much pain. In memory of one of the 
toughest moments of their struggle for land， they named the land they finally conquered as 
“Assentamento Trinta de Maio."8 
The Trinta de Maio came to凶'ein 1990， and 46 families were granted the opportunity 
to work 850 hectares of land. As they settled in the land they realized that nobody knew 
anything about management or had any other necessary skills for such a large undertaking. 
Few， ifany， had had more than five years of formal education， The settlers decided then to 
organize what they called a五eldlaboratory (laboratorio de campo)， a kind of a workshop， for 
the initial period of 30 days. Seventeen courses were carried out during these initial 30 days 
The courses dealt with practical techniques related to the economic needs of the settlement 
but also included activities related to the dreams that individual settlers had nurtured for a 
7 The Portuguese word assentamento means settlement. 
8 Trinta de Maio means "thirty of May." 
350 
lon宵 time.As a result， a few of these dream-related courses such as sewinιchess， 
journalism， management， and guitar were also carried out， and at the end of the 
30-day-period， the Farming and Cattle Raising Cooperative of Settlers of Charqueadas 
(COPAC)9 was founded. 
Although they had received permission to use the land， the land was bare and their 
possessions were limited to little more than the black plastic sheet brought from the camp 
for shelter. Since no trees were available， the settlers began by planting a number of 
eucalyptus trees to be used later as raw material for building their houses. Ittook them 
about a year to leave their black plastic sheet tents and move into their barebones house 
made from the eucalyptus trees. Every now and then they improved their homes， and in 
2004， after 14 years， they were installed in very clean and comfortable houses. 
The history of the rise of MST is a history of struggle， adaptation， and evolution for 
survival. It is the history of people who were largely abandoned by the state. Because the 
open channels with the govemment available in Brazilian society were either too naηow or 
t∞restricted for them to enter， they found themselves completely out of the existing legal 
space， and the only way for them to get out of that situation was to“forcibly" claim their fa立
share of resources for survival. For those living in the rural areas， the way out was to obtain 
land to work and produce. 
1.3. Relation with SBMSS 
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五gure2 -The Social Business Model for Sustainable S∞ieties 
In some ways， the MST has partially inspired the SBMSS framework. Fighting against a 
system that 1eft or pushed millions of peasants into poverty and despair， the real challenge faced 
9 Cooperativa de Producao Agropecuaria dos Assentados de Charqueadas 
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by the MST was to prove that they had a viable “business model円 tosucceed once their demands 
for land were met. In this regard， the movement faced a gigantic challenge when not so fertile 
tand in remote位 easwere granted during the military rule， when there was a strategic interest 
in promoting migration to the Amazon region to secure it against invasion by migrants or 
settlers from neighboring countries. 
¥iVhile the SBMSS framework has taken some inspiration from the MST， its theoretical 
underpinnings are based on the broader discussions of sustainability， where preservation or 
recovery of current ecosystems are balanced ¥vith the need of human societies to use some of 
nature's outputs to improve their material quality of life. Furthermore， the term human society 
means al members， particularly the poorest and the weakest， and not only the wealthy who are 
consuming much more and having a disproportionate impact on the earth's ecosystems as shown 
by indicators like the ecological footprint.10 
It is interesting to see that MST members act and behave in a way different from that 
predicted by the current and dominant neoliberal economic thinking. Given that they had 
been displaced and marginalized by the workings of the neoliberal system， itseems natural 
to expect that they would t巧1to create an alternative system. However， how could they be 
part of the market system， largely functioning based on the tenets of the neoliberal thinking， 
and at the same time act di笠'erent1y?Certainly， MST's attempt to function di丘'erently仕om
traditional economic actors is a continuous struggle alternating advances and setbacks， but 
persisten tly searchinξfor a system that might not discriminate against the weakest 
members of society. 
百四 SBMSSframework is an attempt to create a t∞1 tha t can， on one hand， describe 
the functioning of organizations that care about people and， on the other， provide a general 
guide that can identifシthemost白ndamentalareas in traditional organizations where 
change is needed. In concrete terms， itis hoped that the SBMSS framework miξht be useful 
in showing how communities and organizations can fu百出 human needs while 
simultaneously improving the environment and the lives of the most disadvantaged people 
10 See Kraft (2004)， Wackernagel and Rεes (1996)， or Venetoulis， Chazan， and Gaudet (2004) for 
explanations and illustrations on the ecological footprint. 
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1.4. Exfernal Faclors in MST 
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Figure 3 -The Externa1 Factors in the SBMSS framework. 
明'hena business leader uses a business model to establish a strategy， she a1ways has the 
option of pulling out or avoiding entering a market if she sees that these factors cannot be used 
to her advantage. The Landless Rural Workers， of course， did not have such a choice. As a result， 
the reader will notice a radical di宜erencebetween typica1 business mode1s used by五rmsand how 
the SBl¥1SS descr・ibedhere can be used. It can certainly be used by a firm that wants to overhaul 
its procedures and become a truly socially responsible fum. However， when analyzing the plight 
of disadvantaged groups in society; the framework is more of a too1 to he1p the external observer 
understand the huge barriers created by “society" against these groups. If any group is五ghting
for a space under the sun， they are doing so because they are either disadvantaged or 
marginalized in society， and this means that in all likelihood the externa1 environment (or 
external factors) affecting their life are clearly stacked against them. 
The same applies for the industry and government re1ated factors. Social movements arise 
because the government， due to several reasons， has failed to provide adequate opportunities to 
these segments， either by inaction or by purposely creating exclusionary ru1es. The social 
movements， therefore， are just trying to change the rules that are unfavorab1e to them. For 
instance， Nina， a resident of百intade Maio，出entionedabout the barriers that certain standards 
required for commercialization of food products represent to small (formerly 1andless or 
otherwise) farmers. Many products， such as milk， need to be processed and industrialized to 
obtain license for commercialization. Such rules (which could be improved with the addition of 
simp1e conditiona1 exceptions) make small producers dependent on large industrial corporations， 
reducing their margins of return to the bare minimum. 
Through the 1970s， failed settlements in the Amazon region showed the hopeful peasants 
that the Pl'omising of huge tracts of land were not appropriate for agriculture， and even when 
some initial production was possible， markets were so far away that they could not take 
advantage of any surplus production. As a result， they started demanding land in 1ess remote 
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areas and more appropriate to agriculture. However， through their struggle to have a piece of 
land to cultivate， whenever the government was w辻lingto negotiate， they would fust 0旺erland 
in remote areas， and only those who persisted for several years would finally obtain land in 
places with a decent chance for agricultural production. Therefore， while an entrepreneur 
looking for land to start or expand his or her business in agricultural production∞uld choose 
land that ful五lledwhat he/she thought were the necess位 yconditions for success such as fertility， 
availability of sources of water， quality of water， average amount of rain per year， average 
temperature and humidity， etc.， the landless would have to choose among the few poor choices， 
and often with the soil that had been already exhausted by intense use of chemical fer凶izers，
pesticides and the like. 
With the韮eldalready so slanted against them， these landless peasants needed to五ndan 
effective alternative to overcome all these challenges and enable themselves to IDInimally 
participa te as equally deserving members of society. 
1n spite of al such challenges， the movement has successfully grown to house approximately 
1. 3 million people in Brazil. It is uncertain as to whether their suc白 sscan be credited to a 
unique organizational structure they have created， but it is clear that their organization has 
given strong emphasis to productive activities， which is the basis of their very survival. At the 
same time， themes such as cooperation， solidarity， gender equality and providing opportunities to 
al have become integral part of their organizational ethos， unbke their absence in traditional 
market driven fums. 
1.5. Organizational Structure in MST 
There are two types of or宮anizationin the Trinta de Maio settlement. One is the group 
of 27 families who decided to work collectively， sharing everything related to productive 
activities. With regard to the more personal options， such as their own house， each family is 
free to choose and build its own.百1eother， isthe group of 19 families who work individually， 
cooperating with each other in a less systematic way. For instance， each person has their 
own plot of about 18 hectares， and they inclividually decide what activities to carry out in 
the plot. They also cooperate by lending each other the necessary agricultural equipments， 
or or宮anizingsome activities to宮ether.In this document， we will focus on the or宮anizationof 
the collective group of 27 f・am出esorganized under the Farming and Cattle Raising 
Cooperative of Settlers of Charqueadas11 (COPAC) 
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Figure 4 -Organizational Structure in the SBMSS framework. 
τbe COPAC has the structure of a c∞perative with directors in five sectors: 
1. Anima1 production (Gi1berto Pico1oto) -m出¥:production， hog farm， chicken 
farm， and fish faロn.
~. Agricu1ture (Pedro Wathier) -rice and orange are the main cultures. Corn 
and feljao) the Brazilian bean， are produced in smaller quantities for internal 
consumptlOn. 
3. Vegetable gardens CLeocir Cazaroto， aka Loa) -a variety of vegetables are 
produced for consumption and sale. 
4. Social and Agro・industry(Gorete Cazaroto) this sector is mainly 
concerned with people management and commercialization. 
5. Supermarket CLademir Trombeta) -this sector runs the supermarket 
located in the city of Charqueadas. 
百1edirectors of each of the above five sectors have a mandate of one year， and while 
some may become directors more than once， they usually do not stay for continuous 
mandates to give opportunity to other members of the cooperative to 1earn 台omthe 
experience of being a director. 
The revenue 仕omthe productive activities is divided proportionally to the time 
dedicated by each family， with part of the proceeds being saved for reinvestment in 
production facilities. In terms of hierarchy， Brazilian law establishes that a cooperative 
needs to have a board of directors with at least three positions: president， treasurer， and 
secretary. For the MST， however， the concept of one head (president) does not exist and 
a1though they have an of五ciallist of these 0笠icers，the decisions are actually made 
collective1y by the whole group of individuals involved with the cooperative. 
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The supermarket， as explained above， isone of the five sectors in which the COPAC is 
divided. The superrnarket is currently under the responsibility of Lademir Trombeta. Today， 
the supermarket is the most profitable unit of the c∞perative. Pedro explained that in the 
be広mnm宮， everybody wanted to work in the supermarket， because the work seemed much 
lighter than work in the agricultural fields， and they could be out in the city which was seen 
as a neater place. With time， however， people learned that work in the supermarket was 
actually more restrictive because one had to rigorously follow time， leave at seven o'cl∞kin 
the morning and return home on1y at eight thirty in the evening. In the fie1ds， there are no 
customers waiting for you， so they cou1d work with flexib1e hours. 
It is interesting to note that， inaddition to each community member's role as part of the 
workforce， each member is expected to play a role a1so in any of the following eleven sectors 
of general (public) interest 
1. Production， cooperation and environment 
2. Education 
3. Health 
4. Policy and politics 
5. Communications 
o. Culture 
7. Human rights 
8. Gender 
9. Projects and finance 
10. International relations 
11. Support for new camps 12 
Once a week， settlers meet in groups of 8 to 10 families and each person presents his or 
her reflections， news， ideas， and proposals in one of these sectors. Following these talks， 
each issue is discussed， and later presented in a 1arger forum of the entire settlement. 
As already explained elsewhere in this text， the MST sees education as one of its most 
fundamental pillars. While the MST usually succeeds in havin宮theirchildren during the 
f廿stfour years of education to study in the on-site school， the municipal government 
requires， due to cost considerations， that higher grades be studied in the city. Although this 
option reduces the cost of education to the public coffers， Pedro explained that it has the 
negative effect of having the children lose contact with their own rural culture. The children 
can also be drawn by more materialistic and urban values. In order to avoid the cultural gap 
that can occur as well as other undesirable effects， the settlement or宮anizesgroups of “sem 
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terrinhas，円 orlandless children， who discuss the problems of the children in the settlements 
and camps and propose solutions. 
The equal participation of the peasant women in the movement is pursued with 
determination and great care. The :Movement understands that just encouraging women to 
participate in a1 activities and roles of the movement is not enough to bring about change in the 
conservative and male dominated rural environment. As a result， the MST encourages man to go 
one step further by taking the initiative in cleaning the house， taking care of the children， 
cooking， and the like. While there are individual and regional differences， and there is room for 
further progress， the movement has achieved respectable results in creating an environment 
where humanity takes precedence over traditional gender discriminatory views. 
Notwithstanding those principles， the important thing for the MST is that each 
settlement finds the best way to relieve women from disadvantageous or subordinate roles 
and have opportunities to t巧1new responsibilities if wished. 
For instance， at rnnta de Maio， a daycare center was created by COPAC. Two of their 
members care for five children ages 1 to 5. In the area of preparing lunch， the families had 
decided to prepare lunch collectively in the central kitchen of COPAC， which reduced the 
burden of cooking generally done by women. With the inauguration of the supermarket， half 
the people went to work in the city， and then it became less practical to prepare a collective 
lunch. Therefore， the collective lunch moved to the supermarket， where division of work was 
more meaningful， and in the settlement， each family's cook， went home earlier to prepare 
lunch. As a matter of fact， the c∞ks were generally women， although in some cases there 
were a1so men. 
One of the most interesting aspects of the Movement is the degree of f1exibility that is given 
to each settlement， and to alllevels of the organizations. At the grassroots level， and in a process 
that starts合omthe moment the landless person is discussing whether or not to ]Oln the 
movement， families are organized in the core group of famili，ω (nucleos dθ base)， which are 
groups of 8 to 10 families with affinities to each other. At the next level， camps and settlements 
are found. The number of people in a camp or settlement varies depending on the size of the land， 
bu t typically the size is 企om100 to 200 people. The next level of agglutination is the state level， 
which ranges from a few thousands to about three hundred thousand. Larger states， such as 
Bahia， have an intermediate regionallevel with few hundred to few thousand people. Finally， at 
the nationallevel， there are about 1.3 mi11ion people already settled， and between 500，000 to 1 
million people in camps. Each level has a signi五cantdegree of freedom to organize themselves 
depending on their unique characteristics and needs. 
12 Called Frent，θdθJ1.tlassa in Portuguese. 
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The decision making is always done collectively with issues being discussed within each 
layer but also across layers down and back up， ina system that tries to get as close as possible to 
a consensual process. The levels are shown as“bubbles" because they represent levels of 
coordination only， and are not hierarchical levels. These bubbles always reach down to the 
grassroots， implying that the higher the level in which one is acting， the larger should the effort 
be to reach deep down and remain connected with the grassroots. At each level there is a large 
number of representatives， first to ensure wide participation， and second to ensure that the 
diversity of the people and their functions are properly reflected at each level. The criteria for 
choosing these representatives and coordinators vary depending on the state， but the size is 
generally proportional to the size of people represented. At the settlement level， the 
representatives are comprised by the coordinators of the core group of families and the directors 
of the cooperative(s) in the settlement. At alllevels there is a great effort to maintain the gender 
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Figure 5 -Level of Organization at MST 
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Source: Personal interviews with Geraldo Forte， Ciro Correa， and representatives in 
visited settlements. 
Many organizations talk about cooperation， but the extent to which the concept has been 
internalized by its members became very clear to me during the course of a conversation with 
Ciro Correa. Ciro was explaining how the MST had started in the business of organic seed 
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production. Inexperienced， but observing that most seed production companies carried out the 
production of seeds in the state of Rio Grande do Sul， MST negotiated with a few seed companies 
to have some settlers from that state to be contracted for seed production in their new land. Mter 
a year， some were more successful than others and the seed company decided to renew the 
contracts only with the most successful ones. MST did not agree with this very reasonab1e 
“economic" criterion. According to Ciro，“the 1ess successful seed producers were the ones who 
needed more he1p， how cou1d we abandon them?" As a resu1t， the MST decided to start its own 
seed production business based on the concepts of cooperation rather than competition. 
Finally， Figure 6 shows a comparison between the organizational ethos of a "normal" firm 
and MST， the main va1ues driving the organization， and the effects produced in each case. At the 
least， the organization structure of MST has the human being at the center， while the “normal" 
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Figure 6 -Comparison between traditional organizational structure and MST's. 
1.6. Technology In MST 
The main productive activities of the settlement are rice production， milk production， 
and vegetables. Pedro Wathier， one of the current directors of COPAC guided us through the 
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productive activities of the settlement. He explained how the members of Trinta de Maio 
had initially wanted to become rich quickly like large landowners they have seen their 
entire lives. They decided to emulate the production methods of these large landowners and 
adopted technolo広yintensive agriculture with the use of chemicals， herbicides and 
pesticides. After five years， however， they discovered that soil fertility was decreasing and it 
was necessary to increase use of fertilizers. As a result， costs went up for the farmers， while 
yields remained the same. In addition they found out that with large幽scalemonoculture， the 
soil was becoming compacted and salinized. Mter a period of discussion and reevaluation， 
the settlers decided to produce mainly vegetables， adopt a more earth-friendlytechnology 
based on organic agriculture， and practice of traditional techniques. Today natural insect 
repellents are used in the ve耳etablegardens and chemical pesticides are used only when 
absolutely needed. For soil mana宮ement，they have adopted green manure crops as part of 
crop rotations (Figure 8)， and the production of high quality humus using earthworms as 
composting agents， and bio-fertilizers CFigure 9). In the initial stages of transition，戸elds
decreased significantly， but with learning it slow ly grew to previous levels with the 
advantage of reduced costs， improved quality of products， and increased food security in the 
settlement. 
Most of Trinta de Maio's production today is organic， but certification is st註1a process in 
the working. According to Leocyr， their rice production was certilied by a private company in 
2003. In 2004， the company wanted to buy al the rice production and when refused by 
Trinta de Maio， the company decided to withhold certilication. Now certilication is being 
sought 台oma state org但1Ization.13
The refusal to use genetically modilied organisms (GMO) or transgenic seeds is another 
central technological choice made by the τ'rinta de Maio. As explained in Part 1， GMOs are 
the prime representative of the large scale monoculture technology with unresolved 
uncertain ties reεar出ngconsumer safety and with the possibility of posing threats to food 
security by reducing the robustness of the more natural system made up of a large variety of 
speCles. 
13 Apparently MST had their reasons for not having sought state certification from the beginning， but that 
was not made clear at the opportunity. 
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Fi広ure7 -Technolo幻Tin the sBrvrss framework 
Figure 8 -Use of green manure crops for crop rotation. 
Figure 9 -Humus produced with the use of earthworms 
For their dairy operations (70 of a total of 300 are currently producing milk) they use 
the low-input Voisin Rational Grazing Manaξement system. 14 The idea of the Voisin method 
is that plants and animals depend on each other and， by dividing the land in small paddocks 
that are grazed for only ha]f a day， and then put to rest for about a month， the pastures are 
always in good condition and animals can feed on greener pastures. At the settlement there 
are about 207 paddocks， each 40 by 40 meters in size. According to Pedro Wathier， about 10 
animals are left for about 4 hours in each padd，ωk， and they will come back to the same 
place only after 45 to 60 days when the field has fully recovered (lon耳目 insummer， shorter 
during spring). In additionωthe advantages mentioned above， Pedro explained that， by 
moving the herds daily， the cows do not spend much time with their dung， and even if they 
14 The method was developed by Andre Voisin， a teacher at the Institute ofVeterinary Medicine in Paris， 
and i t first became popular in New Zealand. See Krieger (1994) for details. 
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are sick with worms， the worms will not be ab1e to comp1ete their cycle and will die. 
Apparent1y， the same seems to happen with the cattle tick who became much 1ess of a 
prob1em after the adoption of the Voisin method. 
Figure 10 -Confinement spaces using the low-input Voisin method 
The ho広farmand the chicken farm a1so follow similar principles and they stay in open 
fie1ds (as opposed to confinement) for a good part of their lives. As a result， unlike the 
products 仕omthe big firms such as Sadia and Perdigao， the settlement's production is free 
of hormones， and their pork and chicken have a strong demand in the market. 
Figure 11-Hogs and poultry raised on the field. 
Figure 12 -Convivial production. 
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Figure 13 -ldeal and actual path of technoloεical choice by Trinta de Maio 
It can be observed that the technological choices made by Trinta de Maio improve the 
environment (avoidance of chemicals， respecting nature's cycle to recover， etc.)， enhance the 
human contribution to output Oabor intensive， rather than too much mechanization that 
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replaces humans)， and stimulates conviviality with a participatory and consensual decision 
making process. In addition， the choice of producing a large variety of vegetables enhances 
their self-sufficiency， and provides opportunities to a1 members of the community to learn a 
variety of skills in many fields. 
As illustrated in Figure 13， the issue of appropriate technological choice is one that 
MST has struggled as an organization too， but it shows clear results in increasing benefits 
to the less privileged segments of society by increasing public宮∞dsin the community The 
actual path fo11owed by Trinta de Maio is illustrated by the circled numbers 台om① to⑥.
Large agricultural enterprises are mostly using the technology choices ①3 ②， and ③， and 
staying there. It is interesting to see that for small producers， like COPAC， itwas ve巧F
悩五cultto continue in this path， and the shift to④3 ⑤， and ⑥ turned out to be a better 
choice both for the environment and for the farmers themselves. The ideal path would have 
been 1， 2， and 3， i.e.， adopting organic farming right away. The ① to⑥ route involved a 
detour， but allowed them to reach a deeper understanding of the limitations of the green 
revolution technology. 
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Fi日ure14 -Posi tionin宮山 the SBMSS framework. 
A.s explained earlier in Part 1 of this study， 15 the SBMSS does not only have the 
responsibility of truthfu11y advertisin宮thecontribution of their product to the public g∞d. 
Organizations accepting the challenge of adopting the SBMSS 台ameworkneeds to go one 
step further and work towards a proactive “education of socially responsible behavior月 with
potential and actual consumers， in a way that the act of purchasinξthe product is not 
15 See Area Studies Tsukuba 25:66. 
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driven purely by their utilitarian need， but by their understanding that the act is a choice of 
principles by which a. healthier and more dignified society can be built for a1 its members 
In difierent words， we can say that the conscious purchasing choices by“educated" 
consumers will enhance the publicεood in the concerned community. 
Therefore， the MST actively makes demonstrations， or stage activities such as “GMO 
labeling" day， to raise the awareness of the population with regard to socialiy irresponsible 
attitudes of certain companles. 
Even though they work hard in trying to position themselves as producers 01' healthy 
and environmentally friendly food products， the Trinta de Maio faces its own contradictions. 
According to Nina， eighty percent of the soybean production in Rio Grande do Sul is 
either GMO or it is contaminated by GMOs. Many products derived from soybean， such as 
soybean oil， are contaminated by GMOs. Greenpeace has tested a large number of products 
in Brazil and released a list of those containing GMOs. According to the list， ch∞olates， such 
as LACTA， are GMO tainted.16 
The main problem in Brazil is that society has lost control of the process， and is unable 
ωdistinguish products 、ontaminated"with GMOs from those that are not. If labeling were 
actively pursued by the government， producers would have an incentive to distinguish 
between GMO containing inputs and non-GMO containing :inputs， because then consumers 
would be able to choose between GMOs and non-GMOs.17 
Although the Trinta de Maio strives to produce g∞ds without GMOs， and without 
chemical inputs， their supermarket sells a diverse line of products that are demanded by the 
community， although not directly produced by the Trinta de Maio settlement. Many of the 
popular industrialized food products are believed to be tainted with GMOs， and even though 
COPAC sees a contradiction in the fact that they fight against GMOs but they are 
themselves selling GMOs， they cannot see a way out unless the government implements 
strict labelinεso that consumers and suppliers like their supermarket can choose between 
GMO and non-GMO products. 18 
Governmental action or lack of action is a big factor affecting the welfare of sma11 
producers 1ike COPAC. Unlike the above case that illustrates government's lack of action， 




the requirement that some宮∞dscan only be commercialized if they are industrialized is 
another measure that si炉lificantlyharms small producers without necessarily protecting 
the consumers. For instance， in the case of milk， which can only be sold if industrialized， 
COPAC cannot sell directly to retailers or consumers， but needs to sell to Nestle，19 a large 
multinational company， which then industrializes and retails it. 
1.8. Social and Private Profitability 
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Figure 15 - Public goods， private goods， and s∞ial profitability in the SBMSS 
仕amework
It can be speculated that the particularly harsh external factors against the Landless Rural 
Workers stimulated MST to develop a cohesive organizational structure， with decisions always 
strongly based on the grassroots. At the same time， their technological choices made sense as 
those choices enhanced their role as central actors in the production process. The activities of the 
ち1SThave in most places improved the availability of key public goods without neglecting the 
production ofprivate goods necessary for survival and improved quality of life. 
Some examples of improved public goods and benefits位 e:
L Increase in biodiversity as trees were planted to provide shade， agricultural 
production brought insects and birds， and use of compost instead of chemical 
fertilizers recovered the topsoiL 
2. Reduction in the use of chemical fertilizers， herbicides， and pesticides， reduced the 
contamination of soil and water tables. 
3. Recovery of members' self酬esteemthanks to the opportunity to play a role within 
乱1ST.
19 According to Leocyr， milk processing and distribution in Brazil is largely controlled by two large 
companies， Nestle and Parmalat. There are other small ones， but most of them are controlled by these t¥-vo 
giants. Persona] communication， March 14， 2004. 
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4. Significant opportunities for everyone to learn either in the form of courses， or in the 
form of taking responsibility in any of the eleven sectors of MST. 
5. Recovery of the sense of citizenship of rural women， by helping them obtain 
identification d∞uments and become less dependent on man. 
o. New dynamism in the local market driven by the involvement， and mutual 
knowledge between producers and consumers that make local transactions more 
reliable 
At the side of the private goods， the only thing needed by the settlement was the 
production of enough to survive and continue making progress toward self幽reliance:
1. Enough production to feed all members of the settlement with healthy and varied 
diet. 
2. High demand for surplus production perceived as healthy by neighboring 
communities， bringin宮hi宮herincome to the settlement. 
2. The Tapaj6s-Arapiuns Extractivist Reservation in the Brazilian Amazon 
2. 1. I nfroduction 
The extractivist reservations were the result of long standing demands by rubber tappers 
who lived企omsustainable extraction of forest products， particularly the rubber trees known as 
sen刀Igueira.A∞ording to Mr. Antonio de Oliveira， aka Seu Mucura， rubber tappers had struggled 
for a long time in this Northeastern part of Para state. During the mid 20th century a group of 
businessmen were active in the town of Boim which had existed for about 250 years. These 
businessmen provided local rubber tappers with food staples， guns， ammunition and basic 
equipment in their search for new seringueiras. This time honored way to finance workers and 
lead them to an unpayable circle of debt would force rubber trappers to sel the trails they had 
opened to these businessmen. In the tradition of the region， those who open the trails become the 
owners of the rubber trees identified through this trail. Soon the businessmen became the 
owners of the land， and in the 1970s， after passing through the hands of few others， the land was 
bought by Amazonex and Santa Isabel，同'0large lumber companies. 
In 1975， local inhabitants met employees from these companies cutting trees. They claimed 
that the forest belonged to these ∞mpanies. For the local residents， such arguments came as a 
shock. Ac∞rding to local tradition， people ∞uld be owners of trails to tap rubber 企omthe trees， 
but they would do this in a way that would not damage the trees， and rubber could be tapped as 
long as the tree lived. To own a trail meant protecting the trees. Exactly the opposite of what the 
lumber companies were doing: destroying the forest. According to Seu Mucura， the extent of 
3ö~ 
destruction was hard to imagine without actually seeing it. Because those huge trees have to be 
taken out仕omthe forest， huge tractors destroyed large swaths of forest to create a road to take 
the woods. Destroying those enormous trees was bad in itself， but so much more was being 
destroyed to take the trees out of the forest. 
This irresponsible and destructive action sparked their resolve to resist against the 
destruction and the assault on their land. They formed groups of about 100 people， armed with 
scythes and rifles. Actually， according to Seu Mucura， they had only two rifles， but they had to 
maJ切 itlook like they had many more. In one of the first encounters， when they found a team 
felhng trees， they encircled them， and同 '0leaders of the locals who carried rifles approached 
them with an ultimatum to leave everything behind. Seeing a group of almost hundred “armed" 
people encircling them， the employees f1ed as quickly as they could. They would never realize 
that those a far had only pieces of wood in the shape and colors of a rifle. Over the ∞urse of the 
more than two decades of resistance， even the federal pohce harassed them， but五nallyon 
November 6， 1998， a federal government decree created the Tapajos-Arapiuns Extractivist 
Reservation (RESEX) with 647，610 hectares (1伍nisteriodo Meio Ambiente， 2000). 
2.2. Relation with SBMSS 
The case of the Amazon Region and the traditional communities hving there is a very special 
one. They are different from MST settlements in Southern Brazil where people want to become 
wealthier by increasing the production of private goods， and selling the surplus in the market. 
They are also di妊erentfrom MST settlements in the semi-arid region of the Northeastern Brazil， 
where the priority is to have enough to eat. To a certain extent， the people of the Amazon have 
some similarities with the Landless Rural Workers from the Northeast. They both rely on 
traditional wisdom to understand the natural environment and survive. In the Northeast， they 
survive by planting crops that can survive lack of rain， and in the Amazon， they only need to 
understand the large variety of sourωs of food， herb s，直shand animals. 
In terms of the bounty provided by nature， the particular region of the RESEX is a prime 
example of a place in which free public goods are widely available. All those things are available 
for free to the population， as long as outsiders do not destroy the ecosystem. It is a case in which 
the concern for private goods is reduced due to wide availability of free public goods. As a result， 
the SBMSS takes a unique form， in which the external environmental factors are relatively more 
important in determining the quality of their lives， and the internal factors have a less 
prominent role when ∞mpared to the case of MST described earlier. 
Another important distinction and a clear advantage that the people from this RESEX 
have over social movements such as the MST is that they are considered the "residents" of 
this region， while the lumber companies are viewed as the “invaders.刀Asa result， the 
government gave them the privilege to de五nethe bylaws of the RESEX， which is equivalent 
to shaping the industry and government factors to their likin巳
? ???
2.3. External factors: Change in the Environment and Other External Factors 
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Figure 15 -Social and Environmental Factors in the SBMSS framework. 
The creation of the “extractivist reservations" was one of the most innovative in recent years 
that provided a legal framework to protect the tropical forest and the people living in those areas 
According to David Bornstein (2004， 150)， this is one of the new approaches that moves away 
from bureaucratic “command and control円 approachesto a more decentralized bottom-up 
approach promoting innovation by those directly involved. 
It is possible to see that such a life style will bring very positive results for the local 
environment. In the few years since the creation of the reservation， the local inhabitants say that 
the fish population， as well as game population has clearly increased. With the organization of 
the RESEX and related local associations (which a1'e 1'esponsible fo1' local governance) a more 
structured relationship with the government became possible， and the government's support for 
education has improved. Where some teachers were almost illiterate before the establishment of 
RESEX， today they are all high-school graduates at the least. Teaching materials位 ebased on 
Paulo Freire's pedagogy， focusing on the 1'eahty of their hves. Textbooks have also been 
modernized. For instance， old textbooks that featured foreign animals such as lions， elephants， 
gira茸es，zebras， and the hke， now show alligators， ana∞ndas， armadillos， and other animals 
from the Amazon. 
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2.4. The Industry and Government Related Factors AND Technology 
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Figure 16 -Industry and government related factors AND technology in the 8BM88 
仕amework.
An important set of rules strongly restricts the industry factors and protects the 
environment. These rules are defi.ned in the “Utilization Plan of the Tapajos-Arapiuns 
Extractivist Reservation."20 The plan was created by a participatory proωss carried out by the 
community with the help of the National Council of Rubber-Tappers， NGOs and local 
government agencles 
80me selected rules of the Plan are the following: 
1. Raising water bu丑'alosin the reservation is not allowed. 
2. The extraction of oils， sap， seeds， leaves， crust， or fruits from the trees should be done 
throu宮happropriate techniques that do not affect the health of the trees. 
3. The use of w∞ds 仕omthe forest is allowed only when it is for the benefit of the family， 
such as the construction of houses， canoes， or boats. 
4. Fishing is only allowed through traditional methods such as bow and arrow， traditional 
fishin宮net，and the like， and only for subsistence. 
5. Hunting is only allowed for subsistence. 
Most of these rules are directed to outsiders， and they represent the result of learning企om
past sufferings inflicted by outsiders on the local population. In五shing，for instance， outsiders 
using fishing nets several miles long killed al sorts of living beings in the river. Even the mighty 
Tapajos， 19 km wide in certain places， had become fishless after years of predatory fishing. Fish 
had almost disappeared even仕omsmall rivers inside the reSBl'va厄on.Fish hunting with 
harpoons and masks brought by tourists was quickly adopted by the locals who saw how fun and 
easy was to hunt with this method， and nearly drove the fish to extinction. 80me other predatory 
methods rooted in their own tradition， such as using the timbo poison taken企oma wild vine to 
20 Plano de Utilizacao da Rβserva Extrativista Tapajos'Arapiuns. 
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k出 the五sh，has aIso been forbidden. 
The plan aIso defines much of their technological choices. The plan directs residents to rely 
on traditionaI knowledge of how to ut出zenature's resources in a sustainable way. As the name of 
the reservation itself indicates，“Extractivist" means a reservation that extracts from the fores土
without destroying it. Figure 17 below presents some of the technologies used in the RESEX 
Agriculture is also practiced by most of the residents， but they try to preserve as much of the 
forest as possible planting severaI species of trees in patches of light forest 
Figure 17 -Loca1 techno1ogy (clockwise starting at the bottom 1eft): Local man knitting a 
fish net; 10cal house featuring roof made of palm leaves; classroom in nature;“live" music; 
washing without a machine; local women knitting a roof decoration; 10cal girl knitting a 
basket. 
2.5. Organizational Structure 
37~ 
Some communities are formally organized in associations. In 2001 there were 22 
associations and 64 communities. Associations are formally recognized by the government and 
can therefore propose projects and receive support for improvements of their communities. 
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Figure 18 -Organizational structure in the SBMSS framework. 
These associations are organized in the traditional way with a board of directors with 
functions such as president， treasurer， and secretary， among others. In general， the 
organizational structure cannot be said to be innovative， but locals reported that there was an 
e庄ortto en∞urage women to participate actively as directors to the extent possible. vVhile the 
proportion is stil smaller than that of men， 1 had the opportunity to meet several women 
directors and one president of the association， during my first visit in 2001. In 2004， itwas 
possible to see that women∞ntinued active， but the rise in participation is stil a work in 
progress. 
Participation in the board of directors is not the only way to see the empowerment of women. 
For instance， in 1990， the community of Muratuba was debating whether pmga} an alcoholic 
beverage produced from distilled sugarcane， should be forbidden. The proposal had come from 
the women， and since consensus could not be reached， the decision was made by vote， and pinga 
was banned from the ∞mmunity. 
373 
2.6. Activities 
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Figure 19 -Activities in the SBMSS framework. 
The interaction of the external factors (particularly represented by the Utilization Plan of 
the Extractivist Reservation) and the Internal Factors (i.nternal organization and traditional 
knowledge) produce a unique set of activities based on local tradition and knowledge of nature. 
T旨aditionalmethods are used for agricultural production. There is no large scale production， 
and many cultures share the same piece of land. For instance， rubber tree， banana， mango， 
cupuacu， carambola， acai， all share the same sparse紅白 offorest. However， Seu Mucura 
explained that experience has shown that orange tree8 and macaxeira plants need plenty of 
sunshine， 80 they cannot be planted together with other cultures in the forest. Macaxeira is a 
typical aboriginal culture and is proce8sed into tapioca， macaxeira flour，21 and a popular sauce 
that before being cured under the sunlight can also be used as a powerful insecticide. 
In recent ye位 s，honey production and fish cultures has been started for more stable 
consumption and commercialization. 
21 For the locals， macaxeira flour is almost as popular as rice is for the Japanese， being one of the main food 
staples at the table. 
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2. 7. Social and Private ProfitabjJity 
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Figure 20 - Public goods， private goods， and s∞ial profitability in the SBMSS 
仕amework
According to community members， the establishment of the RESEX followed by the internal 
rules de:fined by the local population has allowed nature to re∞ver. Fish that had been literally 
wiped out企omthe Tapajos River due to over :fishing by private fishing boats is now recovering， 
and game for hunt has also recovered. 
3. Community Revitalization Initiatives Driven by Organic Waste Recycling in 
Japan2 
3.1. /ntroduction 
When J apanese people talk about sustainability， they wilI generalIy refer to self reliance for 
food supply. The thought of dependin広onimports to fulfil its food needs is a major strategic 
concern manifested in many industrialized countries， and it is no exception in Japan. 
Japan currently imports huge amounts of food， and as an affluent s∞iety generates a 
signi五cantamount of or宮anicwaste. 
This section ta1ks about community building initiatives that have sprang up in Japan driven 
by what many people perceive as the wastefulness of modem life style. As Japan became an 
a丘luentsociety， the amount of waste became voluminous， and given that space availability 
for landfills is limited in Japan， alI bumable waste is burnt. Burning waste， although 
reduces the volume of waste， st註1produces a si宮nificantamount of ashes that has to be 
appropriately disposed. A1so， itdischarges polIutants into the atmosphere， and it is costly 
because it requires appropriate facilities and fuelωburn waste. FinalIy， much nutrients 
contained in the organic garbage could be reused， but are simply wasted in the costly 
22 See a180 Doi for a more detailed description of each initiative 
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process of burning. 
Three community initiatives in Mie， Saga， and Tochigi prefectures were studied. All three 
initiatives have in c∞ommon the establishment of a c∞ompostin宮facilitywi託ththe objective of 
reusm広wasteas or広anl詑cf長er此tilizersin口1a宮r口icul江tu工'e.The f白oundersof these local movements a1 
belong to the food industry; though in different stages of the food pr∞essing chain as listed 
be10w (See a1so Figure 21 and 22) 
1. Waste collection: Konosuke Katano， president of Sanko， a waste processing company 
10cated in the City of Hisai (---42，000 inhabitants)， Mie Prefecture 
2. Farming: Yukio Kokubo， director of the Agricultura1 Producers' Cooperative Corporation 
Donkame， located in the City of Haga ('"' 17，000 inhabitants)， Tochigi Prefecture 
3. Consumption: Toshiaki Fukuda， owner of the restaurant Steak Salon， located in the City 
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Figure 22 -Geographic location of cases studied in Japan. 
Source: Reproduced from Doi， 43. 
J¥1r. Katano企omMie Prefecture， as the owner of a waste∞llection company， started 
wondering about how to better dispose waste around 1987， when the Ministry of Welfare 
ascussed the problem in their White Paper. Mr. Katano looked for partners to work together but 
since nobody came forward he decided， in 1988， to start working alone on the problem. In the 
白rstfive years he improved his company's ability to recycle Styrofoam and pet bottles， and in 
1993， he started working with organic garbage. After many years of trial and error， and the 
cooperation from researchers and professionals， he was able to transform organic waste into 
quality ∞mpost in 1995. At that time， however， farmers looked with signi五cantskepticism at the 
use of “garbage" as fertilizers. This difficulty was a common barrier faced by all the above 
men tioned social en廿epreneursas they tried to bring a new activity driven by the sense of social 
responsibility in a milieu driven by the primacy of market forces. For the farmers， the concern 
was that they did not have anything to gain by taking the risk of using compost， while the risk of 
losing trust (by using dirty garbage in their cultures)台omclients in a society w here 
accountability is taken extremely seriously was enormous. 
A small group of farmers， however， started trying the ∞mpost on small experimental fields 
and their feedback allowed Mr. Katano to五netune the quality of his compost. In the process， he 
realized that he needed a deeper understanding of agriculture to produce high quality ∞mpost， 
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and decided to start his own small experimental fie1d. In 1998， he expanded the fie1ds and 
started his own farming business. 
In November 2000， :Mr. Katano and his associates formed a network of farmers called 
Kosonosato， a group of 13 farmers using ∞mpost produced by :Mr. Katano. At the same time， he 
built a direct sa1es point to distribute their products directly to the consumers， and established 
exclusive sa1es outlets inside 10ca1 supermarkets. 
:Mr. Katano's efforts brought an unexpected windfall as those who started testing his 
compost and increasing1y adopted it hit an emerging ∞nsumer demand for healthier produce. 
Generally the average farmer family income in this area is in the range of 300，000 yens (about 
2，600 dollars) a month， which in Japan 1eaves such businesses in the brink of closure. His farmer 
associates today make an average of about 500，000 yens， and some have expanded their 
businesses to a vo1ume of 1 m立lionyens per month. :Mr. Katano's farm sa1e is in the range of 4.8 
m立lionyens a year， and for 2005 he is projecting an annua1 sa1es vo1ume of 7 m辻lionyens or 
more. 
In the ca se of:Mr. Kokubo企omTochigi Prefecture， the initiative was motivated by their 
heightened conscience that the so辻wasincreasing1y 10sing fert出ty.“Therewas the reality of 
moving away 台omthe cycle of nature， and accepting the use of 1arge amounts of chemica1 
fertilizers and pesticides as the unavoidab1e path of agricultural production." He started 
studying how he could recover the topsoiL Talking about the time when he made that decision in 
September 1995 he mentioned that 
"If organic garbage and other related waste can be tumed into compost and be 
recycled into the local soil， the fert出tyof the soil will be recovered and the 
produce will become more energized. What was lacking was the conscience to 
recycle， and the gratefulness toward the fields， iood， and life derived 仕om
nature. 1 learned the obvious lesson that if we can be in sync with the natural 
cycles， we can achieve sustainable agriculture." 
As he studied the issues regarding the fertility of soil， he noticed that many recyclable 
resources in his community were being wasted， often burnt in the public incinerators as 
nuissance. Therefore， he systematically identified all resources that∞uld become part of this 
community resource recycling system and presented a proposal to the government authorities of 
the City of Haga. The project， however， was not approved. 
Convinced that recycling was the answer to the prob1em of 10ss of soil fert出ty，he established 
an agricultura1 ∞operative in September 1995. Eighteeen months 1ater， in March 1997， with the 
support of an industria1 machine producer， :Mr. Kokubo started the operations of his recycling 
p1ant at a corner of his agricu1tural fie1d. In the beginning he offered to recycle the organic 
garbage of the city's∞mmercia1 district for free， and al initia1 investments in machines and 
equipment were made at his own persona1 risk. 
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At the time of the interviews in July 2004， his network of suppliers of organic garbage was 
comprised by 15 public facilities such as schools and daycare centers， 15 stores selling food 
products， and 6 large firms from the industrial district of Haga， totalling about 2 tons of garbage 
a day. The compost produced in his facility is in turn used by 50 farmers， members of the 
agricultural cooperative he initiated in 1995. 
In September 2000， Mr. Kokubo started with four farmers from the neighborhood， a network 
called“Study Group on Recycling" and created a seal identiちringtheir products as part of a 
recycling initiative in town. The Study Group is comprised by a group of farmers committed to 
supporting the community recycling initiative and has currently a membership of 25 farmers. 
The Group has a sales corner in the producer's direct sale market built by the city of Haga. 
As a restaurant owner， Mr. Fukuda，企omSaga Prefecture， felt bad every time he disposed of 
organic waste， wondering whether there was any way to reuse such garbage. His initial proposal 
to start recycling organic garbage was approved by the Association of Restaurant Owners of 
lmari and the Association of Hotel Owners in 1992， but nothing happened until 1998 when he 
decided to start experimenting with organic garbage recycling himself. He started his tests at the 
back of his restaurant but when the number of flies and bad smell increased he decided to 
relocate his experimental composting plant to a remote rural area. 
Although he had to spend his own money for several years， Mr. Fukuda steadily involved 
housewives and local businesses， and as of 2004 he had built a large network involving recycling 
organic garbage， energy saving initiative using oil仕omrape flower seeds to fuel diesel engine 
cars， environmentally friendly farming， environmental education， and local business network 
supporting the use of local currency to strengthen community ties. 
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Figure 23 -The SBMSS framework. 
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3.2.1. External Factors 
Social and Environmental Factors -In these three cases in Japan， the entrepreneurs 
understood that there was an important environmental issue to be addressed; the problem of 
burning valuable organic waste which contributed to po11ution and was costly to the local 
government and local community that paid the taxes. 
Industry and Government Related Factors -Given that the government， through the white 
papers published annua11y by concerned ministries， was signaling changes required in the field 
of organic garbage recycling， the three social entrepreneurs correctly interpreted the future 
trends and tried to take appropriate advantage of moving into these new and needed areas of 
activity. However， each entrepreneur found a different level of support by the local government， 
and unlike the behavior of average private五rms，decided to insist on the merit of their activities 
despite skepticism and lack ofinitial support by peers， local community， or the local government. 
The average business would not have pursued to do business without the support of local 
governments and would probably have looked either for an environment with more favorable 
local governments or wait until the position became more favorable. Those dedicated to social 
enterprises， however， are genera11y aware that their role is to open new path as pioneers and 
need to五ghtagainst either the lack of perception or misperceptions by government officials as 
we11 as the ∞mmunity and consumer themselves. The social entrepreneurs described here never 
took no for a response， and always persisted in seeking the understanding of the government or 
the community regarding an actual or potential social issue that has not yet been comprehended 
by them. 
3.2.2. Infernal Factors 
Technology -The fermentation technology is the mainstay in a11 three cases. This choice of 
technology transfor血 swhat was previously an open ended system -which had seeds and 
chemical fertilizers as inputs， and ashes and gaseous po11utant emissions as outputs -into a 
closed loop system in which organic garbage is composted， reused in the fields as fertilizers to 
grow plants and vegetables， consumed by the community， brought to processing centers and then 
transformed into compost again. 
Organizational structure -The three cases are organized differently， but none of them is 
hierarchic.τ'he fust initiated by 1¥仕.Katano is a loose network of 13 farmers under the 
denomination of Kosonosato. The second， founded by J¥!Ir. Kokubo is again a network of public 
facilities， traders， and farmers， a11 joined by the bene宣tsof working on a commercialization 
scheme that stresses the opportunities to al parties to participate， co11aborate， and profit from it. 
The third， founded by Mr. Fukuda， is a network of networks involving volunteer housewives， 
farmers， and local businesses. The housewives bring garbage to co11ection centers distributed 
around the town， they also clean and maintain these stations. The farmers plant rape seed 
flowers to produ回 vegetableoil for use in schools. The used oil is later co11ected and processed to 
be used as fuel by the farmers in their own tilling machines. Local business owners participate 
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as bona fide service providers to help revive the community through the issuance of a community 
currency， called Hattchi led by Mr. Fukuda. 1n a1 these cases， there is no hierarchical 
relationship but just the desire of everyone to help each other. 
3.2.3. The Output of public and private goods 
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Figure 24 -The outputs in the SBMSS企amework.
These initiatives can be al seen as examples in which concerns with the public good 
guided th e choice of or宮anizationalstructure and technology， and such choices shaped by 
s∞ial， environmental， and government factors became the engine to activities that brought 
about both private and public benefits to the community. 
These initiatives were able to generate the following public goods or benefits: 
1. Reduction of air pollutants resulting from reduction of garbage being bumed in 
the incinerators. 
2. Reduction in the use of chemical fertilizers， herbicides， and pesticides， thus 
reducing the level of chemical poisoning 仕omthe consumption of vegetables， 
increasing the sense of f∞d safety in the community involved， and reducing the 
level of chemical poisoning of farm laborers. 
3. Increase in community linkages driven by the need for voluntary and cooperative 
work in order to make a benefIcial but uneconomical activity succeed. 
4. New dynamism in the local market driven by the involvement， and mutual 
knowledge between producers and consumers that make local transactions more 
reliable 
5. Reduce outlays of local tax resources， makin宮themavailable for other community 
needs. 
The initiatives also generated the followin広privateg∞ds and benefits: 
1. Increase in the income of local farmers who were able to position themselves as 
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producers of healthy veg;etables， create persona1 linkaξes with 1∞a1 consumers 
and obtain premium prices as a result. 
2. Increase in 1oca1 employment， as even these nonprotit initiatives need regular 
staff to ensure the conduct of core operations. 
4. Conclusion 
As we reflect about the strategies adopted by economic and social actors企omdistinct 
communities tackling the same issue of sustainable life styles仕omdi宜erentperspectives， there 
is perhaps a∞mmon 1esson. 
Both in the Landless Rura1 Workers's Movement in Brazil as well as in the communities in 
Japan， peop1e were either struggling to survive or feeling the contradictions of the current 
production and commercialization system. 
The logic driving the economic system is based on competition and pro五ιInorder to be the 
most competitive and/or the most profitab1e firm，自主msgenerally adopt business mode1s such as 
the one shown in Fig 25 below. A∞ording to such business models， the most competitive firms 
are the ones that can best ensure the control of key resources， understand the main competitive 
factors relevant in its industry， use them to its own advantage， make technology choices and 
shape organizational structures that can reduce ∞st and ensure maximum quality， and position 
its products in an advantageous manner in the market so as to deliver the highest customer 
value (used strictly in the sense of willingness to pay for the product). 
It is easy to understand that the system filters and rewards the best performers， 1eaving 
very little if any to the worst performers. In many cases， just having been borne poor， having had 
fewer opportunities for education， and having had difficulties in finding a job seem to be a crime， 
because “average" or “successful" peop1e will shun you as if you have “bad character" or you are 
“出rty"or you are a:flicted by a“contagious disease." Being poor does not means just the inability 
to a在ordthe material goods， which is already a strain， but it often represents being unable to 
access the rights to be respectfully treated as a citizen. 
The question 1eft to the poor and weakest is whether there is a place for those at the bottom? 
Why those who位 eweak， poor， and 1ess ta1ented cannot have a p1ace to live and grow decently， 
without being dominated or oppressed by those who can perform better in economic activities? 
As discussed in the case studies of Japan， the initiatives for recycling waste were driven by 
the sense that the affluent Japanese society was being too wastefu1， and somethlng should be 
made to recycle organic garbage to take advantage of the nutrients ∞ntained in it. These people 
were not driven by commercial or pro五tmotives， but by the desire to do somethlng good for 
society as a whole. The dominant neolibera1 economic thought reflected in business models such 
3B2 
as described in Figure 25 below does not include a concern with the public good. Even the recent 
movement within companies for ∞rporate social responsibility is rationalized as something that 
creates a positive image for the company and therefore increases its profitability. 
日明atthe cases described above have in common is that they are not driven by short， 
medium or long term profit expectations. They are driven by REAL commitments with the public 
good. They are also concerned with the private good， and with profits， but only to the extent that 
such goods and pro宣tsenable them to have a decent and fu1五llinglife， a life in which they can 
pursue their dreams and talents as unique human beings. 
Any person， groups of persons， or organizations willing to apply the SBMSS 金ameworkwill 
not only produce private goods， but will also produce essential public goods as described in 
Figure 26 below. 
1n the BM based on the neoliberal thought， the firm will make choices in each of the major 
factors in a way that it will foster maximum profit because that is what the firm WANTS， that is 
what the BOARD ¥tVANTS， and that is what the department heads WANT， and so on until the 
last man. Many people working in private firms are under much stress because not everybody 
明性NTSwhat the firm and each of its divisions believe the employees SHOULD WANT. However， 
as an employee， anything you want to do must necessarily lead to the宣nalWANT of the firm， or 
the maximization of the profit，江youwant to be heard. 
Similarly， we can argue that the SBMSS that folIows a thought with the humans at the 
center will want to maximize the social benefit by ∞ntributing to the growth of public goods and 
private goods. The main di笠erencewith the BM， however， is that the SBMSS， even when it is 
dealing with the production of private goods， is driven not by the profit maximization goal， but 
by the opportunity to have everyone working on their self realization， their self fulfillment， and 
trying to be everything each of them can be. 
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Figure 25: Components of a Business Model 
Source: Modified台omAfuah Figure 1.2， p.l0. 
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Figure 26: Components of an SBMSS 
This se1f interest should not be more or less than his or her commitment to his or her peers， 
as human beings. This commitment is represented by the respect for public goods， goods that are 
available to everyone 台eeof charge. One especially important example is the natural ecosystems， 
and when these ecosystems町 efunctioning well they purify water and air， they serve as habitats 
for thousands of species of animals and fish， and millions of species of plants， insects and 
microorganisms. Collectively， and including the topsoil， they are part of a living nature that 
produces food 企eeof charge for al human beings rich or poor. 
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Therefore， the SBMSS can serve as a guide to all human beings who feel stressed within 
firms and organizations， because the predominant drive in companies following a BM is not 
directed to nurturing all human beings (inside and outside the organization)， but only to those 
w ho can be the winners within the system. 
If you feel stressed out in your直rm，it is perhaps time to start testing SBMSS principles in 
the area under your responsibility. If there is no space for such an initiative， perhaps it is time to 
look for a different company that may be closer to the SBMSS principles. 
The age old question， however， is“can firms driven by true altruistic values survive?" Can 
such a firm ever exist? 
Social movements， and people who the humanitarian side has spoken louder， are actually 
building such new kinds of "firms" even though "firm" is not the name given to such initiatives. 
They are called nonpro自torganizations， NGOs， associations， voluntary groups， etc. These 
organizations are generally concerned with the rights of certain groups， or monitor the activities 
of firms that are damaging the environment or exploiting illegal migrants or children. Few of 
these public goods and rights oriented groups are involved in the production of goods and 
services for the mar ket. 
At the other extreme， the 主主ms that produce goods and services are increasingly 
incorporating symbolic activities of “corporate social responsibility" such as the protection of the 
environment or addressing social needs of the local community where the company is located. 
U sually， however， the “social" activities of these五rmsare more symbolic than substantive， and 
they generally do not criticize any other ∞mpany or organization even if they are harming the 
public good or they are not doing enough for the ∞mmon good of the local community. Their 
agenda is driven less by the concern to improve the world， than to avoid criticism that may hurt 
their corporate image. 
On the other hand， those who pursue life in a nonpro釦 organizationor in voluntary groups 
to help the poor23 often find themselves using strategies that are closer to BM than SBMSS， and 
find themselves twice frustrated. 
The central research question is how people can be gainfully employed in productive 
activities， avoid damaging the environment， avoid exploiting other people， and find enough 
opportunities to develop hislher skills and talents? This isωrtainly a long process in 
construction， where the SBMSS is the fu・stdraft of the type of firms (or a hybrid between firms 
and nonpro五ts)that may arise and help move sustainable development closer to a real 
possibility. 
23 Comment from one participant in the “solidarity economy" panel at he 2005 World S∞ial Forum in Porto 
Ale gre ， Brazil. 
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17. New Geographies and Regionalism in Education in Asia: 
In comparison to the European context* 
Introduction 
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Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences 
Universi ty of Tsukuba 
官lIspaper explores the assumptions and implications of educational policy for drawing a new 
geography of‘Asia'. It also a社emptsto offer some comparative analysis with the European 
context. The vigour of cross-national educational interaction in the past few decades， as 
argued in this paper， has been a powerful actor for the formation of new identities of 
individual nations and for the promotion of new aspirations for regional alliances. To counter 
other regions， policy makers a仕emptto consolidate the region politically， economically and 
culturally through educational exchange. The paper will look at a number of problems 
specific to Asia in this a抗empt.In this regard， foreign policyヲcultureand coloniallegacies in 
the region capture a special attention. 
1. The basic idea of regionalism 
The movement of regional UI立tyis a kind of the merger of plural politico四economicunits into 
a single body. In this movement， rules by law and organisational cohesiveness based on 
shared values and identity as 'citizenヲ訂eoften regarded as prereq山sitewithin the 
politico-economic body. Members of the body are to be bound politically， economically， 
culturally and linguistically. 1 1n this sense， the idea of regional integration is誌into an idea of 
nation building. This is a reぉonth剖， for some authors， regionalism functionsぉ apolitical 
ideology for creating unifiedむodiesparallel toιimagined communities'. 2 Indeed， despite 
advocacy for the creation of supra-national and supra-state bodies， nation-states訂ethe 
principal actors in the processes of， and after， the creation ofbodies for regional cooperation. 
Lamer and Walters argue that regionalism is a political plot‘to de-na加ralize出e
national' in political鍋economicspace.3 Regionalism also refashions economies， institutions 
1Joseph S Nye k，Pωce in Parts: Jntegration and Conjlict in Regional Organization (Boston: Litle Brownラ
1971). 
L-ArifDirlik (ed.) What Js in a Rim?: Critical perspectives on the Pacific Region idea (Bo叫der:Westview 
Press， 1993); Iver B. Neumannヲ“ARegion-Building Approach to No凶lemEurope"， in:Review 01 
fnternational Studies 20 (1994)， p. 53-74. 
~ Wendy Lamer & William Walters， "The Political rationality of 'New Regiona1ism': Toward a genealogy of 
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and identities at the level of也esupra-national region.4 In al these passages， geographic 
pro氾m句， is crucial.5 In fact， free trade blocs are formed by agreements among‘neighbours' ， 
sharing economic advantage and the quality of basic values such as 'democracyヲandιhuman
rights' ‘Freedom二forinstance， isno longer an abstract belief， but shapes the principles of 
goveming rule by assuring political rationalities.6 Shared values play a powerful role in the 
redefinition of ‘凶， and出elegitimisation of regional societies. The traffic uf people， 
commodities and information is blocked Iess and less by the barriers of older political 
ideologies， and has begun to hinge on the new notions of boundaries. 
In this context， impulses for， and the objectives of， intemational educational traffic 
are increasingly complex. Cross-national educational interaction has become a key issue in 
intemational relations. In the post-World War I period， the organisation of firstly commerce 
and security and later govemment and culture on a regional basis had been reinforced. This 
movement was strongly present in Europe imrnediately after ¥ヘνII，whereas it had not been 
openly witnessed in East and South-East Asia at least until the 1990s.7 
2. Europe as a domain 
Commonly， regional organisationsヲsuchas the European Union (EU) and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)， would have wider social assumptions and implications than 
mere economic ones， their initial interest in trade control notwithstanding. 8 These 
organisations normally advance issues like human capital formation. Intemational cooperation 
in education and training is believed to lead to a 1訂gevision of human resource development 
on the principle of enrich thy neighbours. 
A fine example is the EU educational scheme. From the infantile step through the 
adult stage， and from time同honouredci vilisational gi丘sto the up-to-the-minute knowledge of 
technology， the people of EU訂eentitled to the enjoyment of human wisdom afforded by 
the 1芯gion"，in: Theory and Society 31 (2002)， pp. 391・432.
外BobJessop，“Reflections on Globalisation and its (u1)logic(s)ヘin:Globalisation and the Asia-Pacific. 
Contested Territories， ed. by Kris Olds (London: Routledge， 1999). 
5 Edward D. Mansfield & Helen V. Milner， "The New Wave ofRegionalismぺin:Jnternational Organization 
~3 (1999) 3， p. 589・627
口BjomWittrock， Peter Wagner & Hellmut Wollman， "Social Science and the Modern State， policy 
knowledge， and political institutions in Western Europe and the United States"， in:Social Sciences and 
Modern States: National experiences and theoretical crossroαds， ed. by Peter Wagner， Carol H. Weiss， 
tjorn Wittrock & Hellmut Wollman (Cambridge: Cambridge Universi守Press，1991)， pp. 28-55 
'B訂ryBuz出1.， "Economic Structure and lntemational Securi守:The Limits of the Liberal Caseヘin:
Jnternationα1 Organization 38 (1984) 4， pp. 597-624 
o Roger Dale & Susan L. Rober口ts叩on旦1，ラ
Globaliz羽'2t世ionofEducat註ion"ピf刊ヘラ m江1工:Comηlpαr縛αtilνJeEducαtion Review 46 (2002) 1， pp. 10-36. 
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Comenius， MinervaヲLinguaヲErasmusand al tha1. The Mundus version operates even outside 
EU. In each of the member states， the youth and ad凶tsare educatedぉ宮Ucitizens'. A 
variety of programmes open up chances for the citizens to seek what is attractive and凶 eful
for their study and research throughout the world. Global academic exchange is now not 
merely an idea but has become a s廿ongreality. lndeedラ certainadvantages lie in Europe for 
such development of educational networks. The use of the Latin-base languages helps lower 
linguistic hurdles. The well-established system is b山ltupon ampl eおnds.But these 
conditions are in fact available elsewhere. Nonetheless Europe has some particular strength. 
In practiceラ 'Europeヲ isto be treated not as a simple construc1. Its shape has 
constantly changed， often depending on the politicised notions of inclusion and exclusion.9 
Europe cannot be simply de五nedalso because of its multiple features in raceヲnationalhistoryラ
etc. HoweverラEUmaintains a kind ofιun1ザindiversity' which has sprung from the extensive 
efforts of 官uropeansラ 10
Renaissance scholars assumed a passionate commitment to tracing a European 
identi ty. The intellectual e)φedition of Czech七omComenius is a legacy of a project for 
European unity. Before these pioneer projects，ιEuropean men' had identified thernselves as 
such naturally in their civilising process by sharing the manner and behaviour evolved at the 
Co町1.1 In the continent， the idea of a common culture and civilisation developed beyond the 
eli te reservation and has attracted wider public interest. 12 Even an earlier root of shared 
scholarship can be found in the ancient enquiry into the nature of出eworldラ themeaning of 
life and the notions of knowledge. Later Universit，αs literally began to bond the intellects 
under the papal authority in Bologna， Salerno， Oxfordラ Parisand elsewhere in his domain. 
Afterwards， Studium Generale endorsed by the Holy Roman Emperor had spread in 
Christendom. The Reformation overwhelmed European medieval scholasticism. The Age of 
Reason dernonstrated 'progress' in line with the developrnent of ‘science'. As well， notions of 
hurnani臥 JUSむceand common good have been put forward in the aftermath of recぼ rent
intemational wars across the continen1. 
Modem warfare ushered in the decline of the West. 13 After the two great wards， 
9 David Coulby & Crispin Jones，“Post嗣modernity，Education and European ldentitiesヘin:Comparative 
Educαβ・on32 (1996) 2， p. 171-184. 
10 Raymond Rybぇ“Unityin Diversity: the enigma ofthe European dimension in education"， in:0ギord
Review of Education 21 (1995) 1ヲpp.25-36.
1 Norbert Elias， The Ciνi 1izing Process.・TheHistory ofA1anners (Oxford: Basil Blackwell， 1994 [1939]) 
12 John Lowe，“Education and European Integr加onぺi註n:Jnten加7
587. 
130SWald SpenderラDerUntergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte 
(Munchen: C. H. Beck， 1963 [1922国1923]).
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European leaders recognised that building a peaceful neighbourhood was prerequisite for the 
further evolution of the Occident. During ¥¥明1II， the Education Ministers of the Allies 
gathered to st訂t出epeaceful co中orationof the member states. In 1949ラ theCouncil of 
Europe declared its aim as“to achieve a greater uni勿 betweenits members for the purpose of 
safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles vvhich are their common heritage and 
facilitating their economic and social progress".14 The German Problem was cen廿alto 
discussions on the reconstruction of Europe. Its recovery was contingent upon her moderate 
revival in the European politics and the economy and sincere reconciliation with her 
neighbours. The serious effort of the Westem German govemment and the people for national 
redefinition built a valuable foundation for the unity of Europe after 1945. The reduction of 
national-stereotype has also been endeavoured in Westem Europe.15 There，羽川N1Iand its 
settlement induced the people to re-inscribe their civilisational heritage upon a new definition 
of Europe. Even出oughthe wars in the first p制 ofthe last century brought about the overall 
dominance of the US politics， economy， military and culture in the world， Europe has 
remainedぉ 'acontinent of democracy， human rights釦 dgood education'， having the US as a 
good specimen of European civilisation. 16
Ce口ainly，EU stil has many problems yet to be solved.‘Naturalising' the people of 
the former communist states is among the vital ones. The gaps arisen in the last few decades 
are to be bridged. But even during the Cold War， Westem and Eastem scholars had maintained 
constant interaction. 17 on top of such effort， after having the new members， EU has 
deliberately devised programmes for Eastem Europeans to appreciate vvhat the Council of 
Europe called ‘the ideals and principles'， which are by any means reminiscent of their older 
civilisation. Itis also notable th剖 althese efforts for a harmonious unification of Europe and 
European education have been demonstrated not only on the governmental level but also in 
the movement of individuals and voluntary associations.18 
3. The intricacies of Asia 
百lepicture of Asia is different.百lereis no such a mega-dimensional， monolithic body in 
!f u℃C O∞un附恥Cl応註10ぱfEurop戸e竹ぺ，m江川:ln脱t伝ert刷
iυJ Du Bois-Reymond， Manuela， "European Identity in the Y oung and Dutch Students' lmages of Gennany 
and出eGermans"， in:Comparative Education 34 (1998) 1， p. 27-40. 
IV Sven E. Nordenbo，叫羽1hatis Implied by a European Curriculum?' Issues of Eurocentrism， Rationality and 
Education"， in:0ザordReview ofEducation 21 (1995) 1， p. 38. See also: Audrey Osler & Hugh Starkey， 
下ights，I地d白enti註t加i民邸e郎sa刷ndI恥li恥1芯c山C
C}[E一 dぬucωαIωiωon25 (1999め)， p卯p.1ト-2:199-2幻15
lLowefEducationaMEmpeanIn時 ratlOnヘop.cit. (note 12) 
o Rybaラ"Unityin Diversity: the enigma ofthe European dimension in education"， op. cit.(note 10). 
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Asia. In fact， there are many of smaller sizes entangled with each other: 
Figure: The Framework of Regional Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Area 
Source: Kennichiro Hirano，“Asia ni okeru chiiki-sei no sousei -sono genin wo motomete"， in: Chiiki-shugi no 
kokusai-hikaku: Asia-Taiheiyo， Europe， nishi-hanかuwo chushin ni shit， ed. by Takehiko Yamamoto (Tokyo 
Waseda Daigaku Shuppa由民 2005)，p. 52. (The situation is of 2003. The original figure is reshaped by Shibata.) 
APEC: Asia Pacific Econornic Cooperation 
ARF: ASEAN Regional F orum 
ASEAN: Association of South-East Asian Nations 
PIF: Pacific lslands Forum 
PMC: ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference 
The political， economic and cultural concerns of each body are intertwined with great 
comple氾ty.Each of them is‘weak'ぉ anorganisation. Indeed， many studies， for ex訂nple
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done by Dale and Robertson，甘eatAPEC as equivalent to EU and NAFTA. 19Howeverヲasseen， 
the number of regional organisations is also great in Asia. APEC itself isヲgenerallyspeaking， 
a 'weak' organisation in terms ofthe solidarity ofits membership. 
百四re紅ea number of aspects which explain the specific difficulties of Asia in 
developing the idea and the practices of regional cooperation. Firstlyフitis broadly recognised 
that出Isis because of great diversity in political traditions， economies and culture. Irt terms of 
the size of national economiesラ thegap in member countries is massive: ranging from the 
smallest GNP of 4 billion US dollar (Papua New Guinea) to the largest one of nearly 8ラ000
billion (せleUS).20 Culturally， too， language also varies widely. Unlike former colonies in 
Africaヲ thosein Asia have maintained their indigenous languages as the official language. 
Similarlyラ religiousdiversity is wide. For ex紅nple，Islam is the religion for 90% of the 
population in Indonesia， the 1訂gestMuslim counむyin the world. Within the membership of 
APEC， the sirnilar figure can be applied to Buddhism in Thailand and Viet Namヲ and
Christiani守 inthe Philippines and Chile.百1ereare also HinduラTaoismand many other faiths 
within the APEC region. Although some authors believe that societies in Asia share so-called 
Asian Values，21 there is actually no such a single set of ethos as Asian Values which is 
universally appreciated in Asia. In reality， even in East Asia alone， ConfucianismヲBuddhism，
Islam and Christianiザラ toname a fewラareal mingled into the minds of people and socie訂es.
Confucianism itself has diverse interpretations and applications within Asia. In addition， there 
訂ea number of indigenous religions which pe口neatethe worldview and the conduct of 
behaviour of peoples in Asiaラ e.g.Shinto in Japan. Thus， APEC would be capable neither of 
representing the political， economic and educational interest of its member nations nor of 
exerting great inf1uence upon other blocs.2 
Secondly， apart from these diversities in Asiaヲ thebackground that APEC or any 
other organisation in Asia has not developぉ amega-regional organisation like EU isto be 
explained by the long阻standingpolitical廿aditionof preference for the cultivation of 
ιinformal二insteadof 'formal'，むesbased onιnegotiation'， instead of ‘statutes二among
countries.23 This preference is demonstrated in a commitment shown by some Asian countries 
19 Dale & Robertson， "The Varying Effects of Regional Organizations as Subjects of Globalization of 
Education"， op. cit. (note 8). 




ιDale & Robertson，“The Varying Effects of Regional Org担註zationsas Subjects of Globalization of 
日ucatioぜ"op. cit. (note 8). 
心 PeterA. PetI七“TheEast Asian Trading Bloc: An analytical historyぺin:Regionαlism and Riva何人・Japan
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to so-called 'Open Regionalism'. It implies a preference for norトdiscrirninatoryeconomic 
interactions and the loose definition of the membership， tothe stringent selection of member 
states based on distinct criteria， like the case of EU. The so-called Asia-Pacific Approach 
appreciates the initiative of the individual member states and exempts them 企omcomplex 
regulations for the promotion of free trade.24 The idea of open regionalism was con五rmedby 
APEC as its basic principle in the 1991 joint communique and the Bogor Declaration of 1994 
The third background for the Asian di伍cultyfor ιintegrationラ isthe overpowering 
influence of the political， economic and military presence of the United State on the 
development of foreign relations in AsIa.25 For example， when the Malaysian Prime MinIster 
proposed a vision for the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG)， which implied the exclusion 
of Westem states -Australia， New Zealand and the United States -from APECラ theUS 
govemment enunciated fierce criticisms to the vision 
The US interference of this kind powerfully influenced Japan 's foreign policyラwhich
alsoぉsistedthe tardy harrnonisation of Asian countries. Japan has been deliberately reluctant 
to bear responsibility for the unification of Asia. From the immediate post-WWIl periodヲ the
Japanese govemment has adopted a diplomatic stance of treasuring the relationship with the 
US most， recognising that the US would treat Japan as the most promising ally in Asia. The 
govemment of J apanラunlikethat of West Germany， believed that the country's revival in the 
intemational politics釦 dthe economy would mainly rest upon the relationship with the US， 
and far less on Japan's 副 emptto reconcile herself wiせ1her neighbours. As will be shown 
later， the Japanese govemment took a c訂efulstance to the Malaysian scheme of the 
consolidation of Asia in order not to offend the United States. Japan has remained c紅efulnot 
to link herself too closely to Asian countries. Some Asian leaders regarded this Japanese 
approach toward Asian cooperation as indecisive and disappointing.26 At the same timeラ
neither J apan nor her immediate neighbours， at least officially， has ever anticipated出e
cre出onof a unified Asia under her leadership after 1945. 
and the United States in Pacific Asia， ed. by Feffrey A. Frankel & Miles Kahler (Chicago: University of 
仁hicagoPress， 1993)， p. 21-48. 
日 StephanHaggard，“Regionalism in Asia and the Americas"， inThe Political Econon:り)of Regionalismヲed.
by Edward D. Mansfield & Helen V.恥1ilner(New York: Columbia University P出民 1997)ラpp.20-49;
Akio Hosono，“APEC to NAFT A蜘 Asia幽Taiheiyoto beishu ni okeru regionalism to globalismぺin:Kokusai 
chiiki tougo no frontierラed.by Harald Kleinschmidt & Sumio Hatano. (Tokyo: Sairラ'ushaラ1997)ラp.
145-174. 
25 Mansfield & Milner， "The New Wave ofRegionalism"， op. cit. (note 5). 
26 Peter J. Ka包enstein，“1ntroduction:Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective"， in:Network Power: 
Japαn and Asia， ed.訂yPeter J. Katzenstein & T沿cashiShiraishi (1白aca:Comell University P問s，1997)ラp.
1-44. 
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百leother 邸中lanationfor the 'underdevelopment' of regionalism in Asia is the 
continuously developing sense of nationalism of the countries in the region. Due to their 
colonial histo:ry， the political and economic aspiration for 'nation building' and national 
consolidation stil outstrips the formation of a solid regional organisation.27 Lastlyヲinrelation 
to the previous reason， Asian countries had barely experienced close political and military 
interaction among themselves， while出eyhad been ruled by dorninant Westem powers. For 
example， an Asian delegate in the 1947 Pan-Asiatic Conference in New Delhi confessed that 
there he encountered 'other Asians' for the first time in his life.28 This si加鈎onis definitively 
different from Europe， where intemational wars have always been recurrent for centuries 
Overal in Asiaラ asense of regional identity is ve:ry weak， compared to that in Europe. 
Therefore， political' economic and educational cooperation takes place in Asia more on a 
bilateral basis ra由erthan a regional one. 
3. The idea ofthe East Asian Communiザ
An idea for the creation of an East Asian Commun勾 isa characteristic example for this Asian 
model of regional cooperation. The idea was initially advocated by the Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad in the early 1980s. His argument was that the Malaysian people 
should share the qualities of industrious work e血lCS，a s柱。ngsense of public commitment and 
respect for social order from Japan， as features thatむegenerally said to be based on the 
Confucian moral code. The Prime Minister argued that the startling development of East 
Asian countries was brought about by their appreciation of these qualities -what is often 
called Asian Values -and Malaysia should follow these exemplars. The Premier also 
suggested that while‘European values were European values， Asian Values紅euniversal' and 
co叫dbe adopted in societies of various religions， structures and histories.29 Also， Mahathir 
did not believe出atAsian Values were indigenous to Japanese mentality but were cultivated 
through schooling.30 Thus， inhis紅gument，Asian Values were transferable to elsewhere. He 
took a deliberate anti-West stance and denounced Westem cynicism about the Japanese as 
27 Takehiko Yamamoto， "Regionalism no shosou to kokusai rironペin:Chiiki-shugi no kokusai hikαku: 
Asia-Taihの'o/Europe/nishi-hanわな(wo chushin ni shiteラed.by Takehiko Yamamoto (To旬。:Waseda 
Qaigaku Shuppankai， 2005)， p.ト28
L.() Sumio Hatano，μAsia-Taiheiyou no 'chiki-shugi' to N出on"ラin:Kokusai-chiiki-tougou no frontia， ed. By 
Harold Kleinschmidt & Sumio Hatanoσokyo:Sairyus弘 1997)ラp.17与208
o Mohamad Maha出ir& Shintaro Ishihara， The 均ice01 Asiα， Two leαders discuss the coming centuヴ
Crokyo: Kodansha International， 1995). 
JV Kit G.Machado，“Malaysian Cultural Relations with Japan and South Korea in the 1980s"， in: Asian 
Surνey 27 (1987) 6， p. 628・660.
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being 'workaholic'， and encouraged Malaysians rather to become SO.31 For Mahathir， al of 
these changes would create the responsible， efficIent and trustworthy govemment， industries 
and workers that would eventually lead to self.凶sustainableeconomic growth in the counむy
Now the people were told to Look East. 1ndeed， during his administration， what Malaysia had 
achieved economica11y is striking. In the 21 years， per capita income increased by about 330% 
(企om4，022 Ma1aysian Ringgits (RM) in 1981 to 13，272 RM in2002)，加dits annual average 
growth of GD P was 9.6%.32 
t Thus， the metaphor of Look East PO出lic匂y(仏LEP町)wお ausefおulmea釦nsofr悶ailin培1沼ga，姥g剖ns計
the prestige 0ぱfW也es計temc∞ountrie侶sand of echoing the sentiment of pa組n
metaphor w，お easierfor p戸eo叩pletωo understand the goals they had to pursue than the abstract 
notions of political ideas or ideology. From the outset， this LEP has long been regardedぉ a
relatively successful case of intemationa1 educational cooperation in Asia. IndeedラunderLEP， 
educationa1 interaction between Ma1aysia and East Asian countries has been expanded. 1n出IS
process， however， the aspects of‘culture' and 'values' have become less prominent出anthe 
initia1 advocacy for LEP 1nstead， Look East and leaming from Japan and Korea have worked 
as powerful metaphors for politica1 aspirations for Asian regionalism. In this context， the idea 
of an East Asian Community has been developed as a kind of血epoliticalヲ economicand 
cultural consortium in the region. In the face of the politica1ラ economicand educational 
consolidation within free trade blocs in Europe and elsewhere， itwas suggested that countries 
in East and South-East Asian should be more cohesive and unified so that they could play a 
role in the mainstream of the globa1 economy.33 
Although Asians have the APEC， Mahathir's idea did not五twithin its parameters. Its 
formation was rather his disappointment，むecauseit seemed to him to be overpowered by the 
US and her Westem allies in any event. Mahathir's idea was the formation of 'ASEAN + 3'， 
an enlargement of ASEAN with the inc1usion of Japan， South Korea and China. As mentioned 
earlier， his idea of EAEG faced corrosive criticism from the US. However， itwぉa1so
necessary for Mahathir to stage a counterattack against Westem intervention into domestic 
problems in Asian countries in the n創neof human rights protection， especially after the end 
of the Cold War.34 For himヲAsiancountries should restore their cultural sovereignty that for a 
31 Diane K. Mauzy & R. S. Milne， "The Maha血irAdministration in Malaysia: Discipline through Islam"， in: 
PacificAρirs 56 (1983) 4， pp. 617幽648.
J~ "The Legacy ofDr. Mahathir"， in: New Straits Times， 16 July 2002. 
33 "PMs Agree East Asian Nations Should be More Cohesive"， in: New Straits刀mes，11 Jam泊ry2002. 
34 Sanae Suzuki， "Maha出irseiken-ki ni okeru g出kouno nisokumen -kison kenkyu wo chushin niぺin:
Mαhαthir seiken no 22-nen -bunken review to kiso-shiryo， ed. By Asia Keizai Ker旬usho(Tokyo: Asia 
Keizai Kenkyusho， 2005). 
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long time had been encroached upon by Westem powers. Mahathir's idea eventuaJly evolved 
into the creation of an East Asian citizenship and the formation of an East Asian Community. 
Efforts have been made for the cultivation of a worldview of East Asian citizenry.35 The 
development of an East Asian Community mindset and the fostering of the 'enlightened East 
Asian Community e!ites' were encouraged in MaJaysian universities. In line with trus policyラ
出edean of出eUniversiti Tun Abdul Razak called for the establishment of the ASEAN and 
East Asian Community Credit Transfer System， similar to the one developed by Europeans 
4. The old and new politics of regionaJism in Asia 
Malaysian enthusiasm notwithstanding， Japan's initial response to the policy disappointed 
Mahatrur.36 Japanラsrelationship with Malaysia has never been the prime concem of the 
foreign policy of the Japanese govemment Though lopsidedラ cooperationbetween Malaysia 
and Japan has gradually developed aJong with the bilateraJ interest within LEP in the field of 
education. 
Commensurate with its rise in the world economyラJapanbegan to perceive a growing 
desire and demand that the coun廿yshould take an active role in the intemational community 
apart from the economic arena. However in education， Japan was much behind the US and 
some Westem European countries in terms of the number that accepted those foreign people. 
For instance， there were only 8，116 foreign students in Japanese universities in 1982ラwhereas
there were 19ラ 336in France in the same ye訂加d311ラ882in the US in 1980.37 Thus the 
period of出e1980s was time for Japan to 'intemationaJisピhereducation. In 1983， the 
Ministry ofEducation set forth a 'Plan for Accepting 100，000 Intemational Students by 2000' 
UntiI and after the goaJ was actually achieved in 2004， the govemment has made steady 
progress in the plan by welcoming students from abroad. The st訂tof LEP coincided with that 
of the Ministry of Educationヲspl加.For MaJaysian studentsラ theJapanese govemment has 
been annually providing scholarships of 1 billion yen (33 rnillion RM) on average since LEP 
was initiated. In line with the policyフthegovemment has provided a variety of programmes 
for Malaysians studying in Japan with different qualifications and for different purposes. 
The ef茸fect註ivenessof LEP in Ja叩pa印n
elucαida拭te“dd山un口n略gthe Asian Mo∞neta忽1)γTCr立lS1S臼予 whichstarted in July 1997 in Thailand. The 
::uhateaWo帥 liewfor E制 AsianCitizenryヘin:Nevv Strai凶回開・ラ 17A叩 st2003 
; M陥胤aおch加凶泌d口 f匂ωa必i叩 ian“凶仙Clωu山l
The Report ofthe Central Counci1 for Educa滋tiぬOI民1，ラ 18December 2003 
(h句://www.mext.go.jplb_menuJshingilchukyo/chukyoO/toushinJ0312180l/009.pdf，accessed on 8 January 
2006). 
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Japanese govemment responded favourably to Malaysian requests for safeguarding further 
extending the scholarships.38 In February 1998， Japan provided 465.7 rnillion yen (14.6 
million RM) for 250 Ma1aysian students to st訂ttheir studies in Japan. In the following month， 
the govemment extended a grant of 510.4 rnillion yen (16 million R1vの toMa1aysia to enable 
260 students to continue their studies in Japan and allow another 260 to begin preparatory 
courses in Malaysia.39 Through Official Development Assistance (ODA) Yen Loans as well， a 
disbursement of 49 billion yen (1.6 billion RM) was made in December 1998 for scholarship 
supporting the LEP programmes as well as for the construction of a new campus at the 
University of Malaysia Sarawak.40 As noted by the Japanese Ambassador to Ma1aysia， Japan 
would not have made such special efforts for maintaining assistance to Ma1aysiaラifthe two 
countries had not been cherishing the ideas of LEP. Certainly， the educational interaction 
between J apan and Ma1aysia has brought about ‘a growing Asian consensusラonthe efficacy 
of many features of the Asian approach to human resource development. 41 Furthermore， the 
Japanese govemment could expect to benefit from educating and training Ma1aysians -who 
would become experts on Japan， ifnot necessarily Japanophiles -within the govemment， the 
civil bureaucracyラ thearmed forces and industries in Malaysia. Apart from these benefits， 
howeverヲthemixture of Japan 's'throwing moneyヲintothe region and the relatively tangible 
economic gains from出isoperation was sometimes seen as a‘puzzling behaviour'. 42 
There has been a slow genesis of Japan's interest in the regions of East and 
South-East Asia. From the early part of the last century， Japan has long looked southeast in 
seeking control of natura1 and human resources and overa11 politica1， economic and cultura1 
hegemony in the region. Through the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere， J apan attempted to replace Westem colonia1 powers wi出 herselfin various areぉ，
including in the自eldof education. In 1942， the Japanese Headquarters of the Southem 
Expeditionary Forces announced the 'Fundamenta1 Policy Conceming Education in the 
Southem-Sphere'ラ andordered也atthe Japanese sense of what constitutes an industrious 
mindset must be emphasised in a11ぉpectsof schooling. Instruction in English wぉ forbidden
by the directive ιMa抗erRelating to Reopening of Primary Schools'， and only the Japanese 
and Ma1ay languages were permitted. Al出ough，in rea1ity， the Japanese language did not 
;コ:“RM山14.6伽mSo酬 For町 S加刷加tude鮒凶凶sToS“叫 In Ja川山Jap阿m“が，円ヘ"in λNI匂h仇eの仰川1
:O;"GraヨntFor 260 S泊d配ent臼sTo Con凶1泊U位tinu旧∞1児.eStudies in Japa加n'円"in紅:λNe仰wStraits Times， 7 March 1998. 
2wp鵬 seLoanF凶川町ects"，in: New Sか仰Tim民 19December 1998 
一 William K. Currunings，“The Asian Human Resource Approach in Global Perspectiveぺin:0宅fordReview 
oJEducation 21 (1995) 1， p. 67-81 
斗ιMingWan，“Japan and the Asian Development Bankぺin:Paci.fc Affairs 68 (1995) 4， p. 509耐528.
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become the practical medium of instruction 43 and rather such oppressive policy of the 
Japanese military govemment awakened a sense of Malay ethnic identityヲtheideology of the 
Japanese govemment was to create a dutiful subject of the Japanese emperor state in 
乱1alaysia.44Also， during this wartime period， a number of elite students of South-East Asia 
studying in Japan were regarded as a kind of hostage by the Japanese govemment for its easy 
rule in Sough-East Asia. 45 
This historically contingent relationship between Japan and the South-East Asian 
reglOn wぉ revitalisedin the 1970s when Japanese industries grew again on capitalist lines 
and began to seek economic ties in the region. It was also a period of decline for American 
inf1uence and monetary power vacuum in the region， partly due to Nixon Shock and the fal 
of Saigon. 46 In 1977，出eJapanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda pronounced an 
epoch-making declaration in the Fukuda Doctrine， which demonstrated Japanラピhear-to-heart
diplomacy' for Asian countries. This idea set out the basis of Japan's ODA policy. In the 
1980sヲ whileUS leaders were experiencing their Nation at Risk， Japan began to achieve a 
major position in the world economy. In due courseラ Japanestablished a stable trading and 
production bloc in Asia. Ironicallyラせlepre-w紅 ideaof the Asian Co四Prospe口tySphere 
vl討uallyc釘neせueafter， and arguably because of， her defeat in the w紅 47This time， unlike in 
the pre-war period，出egovemment's nationalist policy surfaced along with its awareness that 
Japan should stand on a more friendly footing in the intemational comm山口tythan i t had 
during the war time. 
Through ODA， Japan has provided a large amount of financial aid for countries in 
East and South-East Asia through intemational agencies such as the Asian Development Bank. 
For instance， between 1987 and 1993， Japan loaned 30.4% of the totallending capac勾 ofthe
bank， while the total figure for al European members wぉ 39.8%and that for the US was 
11.70/0.48 As the m勾ordonor， Japan has exercised a dominant Influence on the operation ofthe 
bank. During the Asian Monetary Crisis， the Japanese gove口nnentannounced that it had 
43 Hitosrn Sugimoto，λぬlaysiani okeru kokus引かoikulwnkei， Kyo此uheno global impact (Tokyo: Tosrnndo， 
2005); Hirosrn Tawada， "Gendai Ma1aysia ni okeru Islamu-ka no tenk出ぺin:Bulletin of的eF.αculかof
Liberal Arts， Mαrgasαki Uniνersity 37 (1996) 1， p. 103-126. 
44 Cf. Noriko MatsunagaラNihongunsei-lw no Malaya ni okeru nihon-go kyoiku (Tokyo: K位細部hobo，
2002). 
45 Sugimoto， Malaysia ni ok例 kokusaikyoi仰抑制，Kyo伽 henogl伽 1impactラop.cit. (note 43) 
46 Tadahiro Y osrnda，“East Asian Regiona1ism and Japariヘin:JETRO Working Paper Series 03/04 No. 9 
(Tokyo: Institute ofDeveloping Economies in APEC Study Center， JETRO， 2004). 
47 Walter Hatch & Kozo Yamamura， Asia in Japan's Embrace: Building a regional production alliance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UniveぉityPress， 1996); Roy Hotheinz Jr.ラ&Kent E. Calder， The Eαstasia Edge 
(.New York: Basic Books， Inc.， Publishers， 1982). 
哨 W飢“Japan and the Asian Development 助成ヘop.cit. (note 42). 
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decided to make one幽fourthof the entire IMF aid amount available to ASEAN countries.49 In 
出efollowing monthラ theJapanese Ministry of Finance announced the concept of an Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF)， aおndof 10 billion US dollar for the countries suffering from the 
crisis. In 1999ラtheJapanese govemment credited around 120 billion yen (3.76 billion RM) to 
Malaysia， a record-high figure for yen loans.50 In education， as shown earlier， a large number 
of scholarships had been provided to Malaysians during the crisis. These出dshad been made 
despite American intervention. The US govemment observed Japanヲsgrowing inf1uence in 
Asia unfavourably and noted the concept of an AMF as aιmoral hazardソIThe US tried to 
redirect the Japanese yen to Brazil whoseむeasuryhad similarly fallen in crisis. In order to 
maintain support for Asia， the Japanese Ministry of Finance made a deal with its US 
counterpart that J apan would raise her emergency suppo此toBrazil from the initial amount of 
1 billion US dollar to 1.25 billion， in exchange for the US no longer imposing arbitrary 
pressure upon Japan's ODA in the Asian region. 52 
These acts of the Japanese govemment demonstrated Japan's strategy to appeal her 
sせongpo1itical and economic presence in Asia， although there was criticism企omAsian 
countries conceming Japan 'sinsufficient role in resolving the crisiS.53 Assuring her power in 
Asia has been increasingly cmcial for Japanヲasnew geographies have been developing since 
the end of the Cold War. After the collapse of the SovIet Union， the US Secretary of State 
procl包medthe creation of a new community， ranging 'from Vancouver to Vladivostok二with
J apan being outside these leading economies. It should also be noted由at由issituation has 
gradually been changed with the rapid rise of China in the politics， economy and milit担ym
Asia. From the early 2000s， China has begun acting as one of the most enthusiastic countries 
in the Pacific Rim for the development of the‘East Asian Community'. 54 
5. Conclusion 
The assumptions and implications of educational interaction have been e却 loredby looking at 
the specificities of Asia in comparison to those of Europe. The山古onof European countries 
has been united stunningly beautifully within the last few decades， a nillllber of awaiting 
。Yoshidぇ“EastAsian Regiona1ism and Japan七op.cit. (note 46) 
50 Minisむyof Education， Japan， Higαshi-Asiαshokoku ni taisuru kokusai-senryaku no ari知的nikansuru 
chosa (Tokyo: Minis町 ofEducatio孔2005).
51 Yoshida，“East Asian Regionalism and Japan"， op. cit. (note 46). 
52マuraguToho-s悶 kuラSaidai-kibono Yen-shal制 wouke印刷aysia"，Asahi Shinbun， 31May 1999 
_)J "In Defense ofιAsian Values'"， in:Time， 16 March 1ヲ98.
54 Kazuko Mo凶i，山HigashiAsiaKyodotai' to chugoku no chiiki-gaiko"， in:Chiikiイhugino kokusai hikaku. 
Asiα-Taiheiyo/Europe/nishi-hanわ必.{wo chushin ni shiteラed.by Takehiko Yamamoto (To勾0:Waseda 
Daig法uShuppa叫caiラ2005)ラp.65-82; Yoshidaラ<EastAsian Regionalism and Japan"， op. cit. (note 46). 
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solutions notwithstanding. Europe has demonstrated a number of accounts of particular 
ιstreng也ラ thatlack in Asia. What is unique about Europe and new to its history is the 
establishment of a mega supra-national society within which transnational values are 
appreciated. And what is so remarkable of Europeans is the resourceお1use of their 
long-establishedラhistoricalくulturalrelations for their own socieザandbeyond. 
The effects of educational transfer have entailed political and econornic assumptions 
in global politics and economic relations. A policy for educational interaction can work for the 
direction of foreign policy. In Europe， with new notions of communal boundaries， the vigour 
of educational interaction has consolidated political interest， economic advantage and cultural 
qualities of the membership of regional societies. Intemational cooperation in education is 
both the basis for， and the effect of， national definition and re-definition 
羽毛latmakes so difficult for Asia to reach the same level of unification are the 
absence of historical-cultural relations which would bridge national gaps， the strong presence 
of extemal intrusion， the insufficient sense of responsibili守 ofthe leadership， the 
underdevelopment of a clear vision of Asia in the post-colonial era andヲonthe whole， a lack 
of political will. In sumヲ drawinga new geography of ‘Asiaラ seemsto be a very ambitious 
undert北ing.In Asiaラthe 'modemity project' i臼ss鈎台i立1und由er附1羽w鳩r也匂a
yet overれw月ゐN油vlrhelmthe puわbli詑cWl込出i口1for regional u凶I江n立i五ca鉛t台10r註1.on the other hand， apparently there is 
a political and educational motivation for the creation of a powerful regional society. The 
foundation of U乱仏P(University Mobility in Asia and the Pacific) in 1991 is an example of 
such a will. Its performance， however， illustrates another example of tardy progress or even 
malfunction in forrning reciprocal agreements， not to speak of the credit transfer system， 
among the member countries. If Asian countries wish to follow the path of El人thereseems to 
be a long way to go for them to create their socieちrcapable of representing the political， 























~232) の前後ころからである(奈良 [1979J 178頁を参照)。仏教の法(ダノレマ)による
統治の理念を記したアショカ王法勅碑文のうち、アフガニスタンやガンダーラのタキシラl
で発見されたものはアケメネス朝の公用語で、あったアラム語で記され、アショカ王碑文の































































































































3久野 [1930J í 二、『大事~ (Mahavas印)の十地Jに『大事』の十地の全訳と解説がある。
4 教量部や醤日食者は大乗と同様無自性を説き、後者はその他にも大乗との共通点が多し、(宮本[1929J、
平)1 [1989J 17頁を参照)。自性清浄心は大衆部以外の部派にも見られ、パーりの阿含経ですでに
































































































































































































[2000] pp. 136& 153を参照)。








場所に作られた(Williams[1972] p.157，神谷[2004Jを参照)0 P位ides[1907]や Paassen[1967] 
によれば、 St.John教会が現在大モスクになっているが、それは城郭 (citadeI)のなかにあ
るので、 Kale(ιCitadel')Mosque(図 1の右上)のことである。しかし、 “The Kale Cami， or 
Mosque of the Citadel円に St.George教会とそのゲストハウスの遺跡があると Williams[1972] 
(p.158)は述べており、 St.Georgeは軍人・騎士の守護聖人、キリスト教軍の総帥として信仰


























とが多い(日本聖書学研究所編 [1976J497頁訳注一七Oの 14、森安 [1978J227頁を参
照)。しかし、トマスが生きていたころ、キリスト教はまだエデッサに伝わっておらず、ト
マス自身はエデ、ッサと縁もゆかりもない人であった90 また、カラカラ帝(位 21ト7) のロ
ーマに般属するまでのエデッサはパルティアと結んでローマと対抗することが多かった。





























































Kingdom of Armenia at its greatest extent under the Artaxiad Dynasty after the conquests ofTigranes the Great， 80 BC. 
図6 紀元前 80年ころのアルメニア王国





















































































































マルコ 60年代、マタイ・ルカ 80年代、ヨハネ 90年代と推定され(新約聖書翻訳委員会訳
[2004J 915-8頁を参照)、キリスト教のインド伝播に対する反響が西方に伝わってしばら
















































464頁訳注二の 8)。仏教学においては、平)1 [1974J (292頁)が紀元前後にゴンドブエノレ
ネース治世を震いた(平)1 [1989 J 193頁でも訂正されていなし¥)。また、 Eliot[1921] (p.428) 
の説に従って阿弥陀仏のキリスト教起源説が成立する余地はないとも説かれた(藤田
13 贈り物は黄金と乳香と没薬である (Wマタイ福音書~ 2:11)が、黄金も実は没薬と同じくパルサム
の香料であるという説もある(ワット&セラー [1998J34頁を参照)。

































































































































ベシャワール博物館蔵 出所:高田 [1967J図版 15































右 タキシラ個人蔵(所在不明) 銘文は“budhamitrasaolo'ispare danamukhe budhamitrasa 
arnridaha... ，"英訳は ( The Avalokesvara of Buddhamitra， a sacred gift， the Al1f1abha of 
Buddhamitra.. .) (Brough[ 1980] pp.66&67) 









(13本聖書学研究所編 [1976J217頁、森安 [1978J226ヴ真を参照)が、根拠はない (Phillips
[1903]， Gillman and Klimkeit [1999] pp.l61ff.を参照)。 トマスを処刑したとされるミスダイ
(シリア語写本ではマツダイ)王がインド・パノレティア王国に代わって西北インドを支配
したクシャーナ朝のヴアースデーヴァ(1世)である (Lるvi[1904] pp.14f.， Medlycott [1905] 
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